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THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND FEDERAL DISCOVERY: A 
NEW THREAT TO CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 
Jennifer Lynch* 
Abstract 
Lawyers for the State of California have argued recently in several 
federal civil rights cases that the state sovereign immunity doctrine bars 
all discovery issued to the state, its agencies, and its employees. While 
courts agree that sovereign immunity generally protects states from suit 
in federal court and that this immunity does not extend to state 
employees, it is unclear whether state sovereign immunity should apply 
at all to federal discovery, especially when discovery is a necessary part 
of a lawsuit against a state employee. 
This Article is the first to analyze states’ attempts to expand the 
sovereign immunity doctrine to block discovery in federal court. Few 
courts have yet addressed this issue. However, based on the Supreme 
Court’s expansion of sovereign immunity and contraction of civil rights 
protections in the last few decades, it should prove a fertile area for 
analysis in the years to come.  
This Article focuses on the states’ use of this defense in prisoners’ 
rights cases because the defense will likely have the broadest 
application in that context. State prisoners filed over 18,000 civil rights 
cases against state employees in the federal district courts between 
March 2007 and March 2008, and the yearly caseload continues to 
increase. Prisoners almost always represent themselves in civil rights 
cases, have little access to evidence, and are unlikely to be able to 
navigate the nuances of an Eleventh Amendment argument. For these 
reasons, they could suffer the worst. Yet, this issue is not limited to 
prisoners’ rights cases. The state could raise this defense in any case in 
which a party seeks evidence from the state—whether the case itself is 
brought against a state employee or not.  
In this Article, I compare tribal and federal sovereign immunity case 
law within the state sovereign immunity context. I then analyze three 
main rationales supporting state sovereign immunity. I argue there is an 
implied exception to the state sovereign immunity doctrine limiting its 
application to lawsuits rather than ancillary federal court processes such 
as discovery. I therefore conclude the states’ sovereign immunity 
defense to discovery lacks foundation in either law or policy. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 * Lecturer & Supervising Attorney, Samuelson Law, Technology & Public Policy 
Clinic, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law. I am grateful to Ty Alper, William 
Fernholz, and Aaron Burnstein for their comments and suggestions. This Article and my interest 
in this subject arose out of court briefs I wrote while representing several female prisoners pro 
bono in three civil rights lawsuits against prison officials employed by the State of California. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2005, California state correctional officer, Manuel Gonzalez, was 
stabbed and killed by an inmate at the prison where he worked.1 The 
inmate who killed him had a long history of violence against prison 
staff and other inmates and had been housed in a single cell in 
maximum security in one of California’s highest security prisons.2 He 
was admitted to the prison where Officer Gonzalez worked after being 
convicted of the attempted murder of a police officer and sentenced to 
seventy-five years.3 Despite this history, prison authorities placed the 
inmate in the general population under the supervision of correctional 
officers like Officer Gonzalez, who were not issued protective vests.4 
Several months after the inmate arrived at the prison, Officer Gonzalez 
took the inmate out of his cell under the mistaken assumption that the 
inmate was influential among his peers and could ease racial tensions at 
the prison.5 Instead, the inmate turned on him and stabbed him.6 Officer 
Gonzalez died of his injuries shortly thereafter.7 
After Officer Gonzalez’ death, his relatives sued the prison warden 
and various other California state correctional employees and officials 
under 42 U.S.C. § 19838 for violating Officer Gonzalez’ civil rights by 
improperly classifying the inmate and thus failing to protect Gonzalez 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Estate of Gonzales v. Hickman, No. ED CV 05-660 MMM (RCx), 2007 WL 3237727, 
at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 30, 2007). 
 2. Id. at *13–18. The decedent’s last name is spelled variously by the courts and by his 
attorney as “Gonzales” or “Gonzalez.” The majority of the opinions in this case use the spelling 
“Gonzalez,” so I will use this spelling throughout this Article. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at *10. 
 6. Id. at *2. 
 7. Id. 
 8. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
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from harm.9 However, when the relatives tried to use a routine civil 
discovery request to obtain evidence from the state to show that the 
state defendants knew the inmate was a high security risk, the state 
refused to turn over documents. The state argued the Eleventh 
Amendment and the doctrine of state sovereign immunity protected it, 
its agencies, and its employees from all federal court discovery.10 A 
federal district court agreed and denied the discovery request, 
preventing the plaintiffs from obtaining any evidence in the state’s 
possession that would help them prove their case.11 
California has since been using the Gonzalez opinion as a shield to 
try to block discovery requests in several unrelated civil rights lawsuits 
brought by state prisoners. The state’s goal seems to be to convince 
federal judges that civil rights plaintiffs may not obtain discovery from 
any sources affiliated with the state—whether those are nonparty 
agencies or employees, or even the individual state employee 
defendants themselves. While it is settled that states generally enjoy 
immunity from suit in federal court,12 state employees do not.13 And it 
is not clear state sovereign immunity extends to federal discovery 
processes, especially when discovery is a necessary part of a lawsuit 
against a state employee to whom that immunity does not apply.  
There are very few published opinions on the issue of state sovereign 
immunity and federal discovery. Only one case in any of the courts of 
appeals has addressed the issue,14 but that case relies on questionable 
precedent15 and has not been cited for the same proposition by any other 
court even though it is more than ten years old. No court other than 
Gonzalez has yet, on record, agreed with the state’s position. However, 
one case with a favorable ruling for the civil rights plaintiffs is currently 
on appeal to the Ninth Circuit on this issue.16  
This Article explores the state’s argument that sovereign immunity 
                                                                                                                     
 9. Estate of Gonzales, 2007 WL 3237727, at *1. 
 10. Id. at *1. 
 11. Estate of Gonzalez v. Hickman, 466 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (E.D. Cal. 2006). 
 12. States may be sued in federal court in two situations: if they have explicitly waived 
their immunity, see infra Part III.D.1.c; see, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 737 (1999), or 
if Congress, acting through its Amendment XIV, § 5 powers, abrogates state sovereign 
immunity, see, e.g., United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158 (2006). 
 13. See e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908) (finding suits against state 
officers sued in their official capacities for injunctive relief are constitutionally cognizable); 
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238 (1974) (finding suits against state officers sued in their 
individual capacities for damages do not invoke the protections of the Eleventh Amendment). 
 14. In re Mo. Dep’t of Natural Res., 105 F.3d 434, 435–46 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 15. See infra Part V.B. 
 16. Notice of Appeal, Allen v. Woodford, No. 05-1104 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2008); Allen v. 
Woodford, No. 08-16118 (9th Cir.). The Ninth Circuit, after hearing oral argument on October 
7, 2009, deferred submission pending a proposed settlement by the parties. See Order of USCA 
as to 228 Notice of Appeal, Allen v. Woodford, No. 05-1104, (E.D. Cal Oct. 9, 2009). 
4
Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 1 [], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol62/iss1/5
2010] A NEW THREAT TO CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 207 
 
protects it, its agencies and its employees from discovery in federal 
court and explores the possible ramifications of that argument on civil 
rights cases.17 In Part II, I provide an overview of the state sovereign 
immunity problem and introduce four key cases in which it arose. In 
Part III, I discuss the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of state 
sovereign immunity and present and distill three rationales courts use to 
support the broad reach of the doctrine. In Part III, I also present a new 
implied exception to the sovereign immunity doctrine: that sovereign 
immunity is limited to lawsuits and similar adversarial proceedings and 
does not apply to ancillary processes of the federal courts such as 
discovery. In Part IV, I discuss parallels and distinctions between state 
sovereign immunity and the immunity of other sovereigns, including the 
federal and tribal governments. And in Part V, I explore the application 
of the various sovereign immunity principles to discovery processes, 
comparing the analysis in Estate of Gonzalez with key cases discussing 
the intersection of discovery and federal and tribal sovereign immunity.  
I conclude in Part VII that the state’s argument is incorrect legally 
because neither the text of the Eleventh Amendment nor subsequent 
Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that state sovereign immunity 
extends beyond the scope of lawsuits or other adversarial proceedings to 
apply to the ancillary or incidental processes of a federal court such as 
discovery. In addition, I conclude that the state’s position is incorrect 
from a policy perspective because it has the potential to undermine the 
entire field of civil rights litigation against state employees: If a civil 
rights plaintiff cannot obtain evidence in her case, she cannot prove her 
claims and therefore cannot pursue the case at all.  
II.   OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM AND FOUR KEY CASES 
The case law and scholarship on state sovereign immunity is so 
complicated and convoluted that its discussion is generally limited to 
constitutional law scholars and Supreme Court justices.18 Yet lawyers 
                                                                                                                     
 17. Although this Article focuses on civil rights cases and specifically on several cases 
litigated in California, this issue affects cases outside of both the civil rights context and 
California. Any state could raise this defense in any federal civil case in which a party seeks to 
obtain discovery from the state, its agencies, or its employees. S , e.g., Arista Records LLC v. 
Does 1-14, No. 7:08cv00205, 2008 WL 5350246, at *3 (W.D. Va. Dec. 22, 2008) (addressing 
same issue in copyright lawsuit where subpoenas were issued to Virginia Tech);Jackson v. 
AFSCME Local 196, No. 3:07CV0471 (JHC), 2008 WL 1848900, at *1–3 (D. Conn. Apr. 25, 
2008) (addressing same issue as to labor relations). 
 18. Judge William A. Fletcher on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals once described the 
Eleventh Amendment as “one of the Constitution’s most baffling provisions.” William A. 
Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an 
Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. 
REV. 1033, 1033 (1983). 
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for the State of California (and perhaps other states)19 are now arguing 
this doctrine should be used to bar discovery in civil rights actions 
brought against state employees. This argument is problematic from a 
legal standpoint for many reasons, which this Article will discuss in 
detail. However, this argument is also problematic from a public policy 
standpoint for two main reasons. First, if a state, its agencies, or its 
employees could block discovery with a sovereign immunity defense, it 
would undermine well-settled Supreme Court precedent that finds 
sovereign immunity does not extend to protect state employees.20 By 
preventing a plaintiff from obtaining discovery from any source 
affiliated with the state (and if the plaintiff is suing a state employee, at 
least some of the evidence must lie within the possession of the 
employee or his employer state agency), it prevents her from pursuing 
her case to completion. It allows state employee defendants to bring in 
through the back door a sovereign immunity defense that they would 
never be able to rely on in the case itself.  
The state’s position is also problematic for a second reason: It has 
the potential to undermine the important and well-recognized remedial 
purposes of the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,21 because 
it would come up most often in the civil rights context.22 California is 
currently wielding this complicated legal doctrine in civil rights cases 
brought by state prisoners who generally lack access to adequate or any 
legal representation. Although in the cases that will be discussed further 
in this Article all plaintiffs were represented by counsel,23 most 
                                                                                                                     
 19. It is hard to determine if other states are using this argument as federal court orders 
addressing discovery issues are rarely published. 
 20. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908) (finding suits against state 
officers sued in their official capacities for injunctive relief are constitutionally cognizable); 
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237–38 (1974) (finding suits for damages against state 
officers sued in their individual capacities do not invoke the protections of the Eleventh 
Amendment). 
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 22. See, e.g., Rhodes, 416 U.S. at 243 (stating Congress’s intent in enacting § 1983 was 
“to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment against those who carry a badge of 
authority of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their 
authority or misuse it” (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171–72 (1961))); Monroe v. 
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961) (holding that through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Congress sought “to 
give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an 
official’s abuse of his position”). 
 23. See Allen v. Woodford, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1139 (E.D. Cal. 2008); Thomas v. 
Hickman, No. 1:06-cv-00215-AWI-SMS, 2007 WL 4302974, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2007); 
Jett v. Penner, No. 02-2036, 2007 WL 127790, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2007). Mr. Lance Jett, 
the plaintiff in Jett v. Penner, first filed his case pro se. The magistrate judge assigned to his 
case denied his request for counsel and request for legal assistance (Doc. No. 22, May 15, 2003) 
and issued findings and a recommendation that the district court judge grant the defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 46, Jan. 16, 2004). See also Doc. No. 53 (Mar. 20, 
2004) (adopting the findings and recommendation in full, granting the summary judgment 
6
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prisoners cannot obtain counsel and thus must represent themselves in 
civil rights litigation.24 Prisoners filed over 18,000 civil rights cases in 
the federal district courts in the twelve months preceding March 31, 
2008, and the yearly caseload continues to increase.25 In the Eastern 
District of California alone (where most of California’s state prisons are 
located), nearly 50% of the court’s caseload—over 1,800 cases in 
2005—consists of prisoner-filed cases.26 Of those, more than 1,000 
were civil rights cases brought under the federal civil rights statute, 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.27 Because there are so many prisoner civil rights cases 
every year and because so many of those cases are brought pro se, the 
ramifications of an Eleventh Amendment immunity defense to 
discovery are broad; pro se prisoners are much less likely to be able to 
navigate the nuances of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence than 
lawyers (who often have trouble themselves). And, while not all of 
these cases are meritorious, many cases raise grave issues that should 
not by buried through questionably meritorious discovery battles. 
Eastern District of California Magistrate Judge Kimberly Mueller notes 
that, of the nine prisoners’ rights cases that survived summary judgment 
and for which she has sought counsel, “three alleged denial of 
constitutionally adequate medical care, one excessive force and denial 
of care, two denial of free exercise of religion, and one failure to protect 
in violation of the Eighth Amendment.”28 In fact, conditions are so dire 
in California prisons that a federal district court judge has ordered the 
state’s entire prison medical system under receivership.29  
                                                                                                                     
motion and terminating the case). It was not until Mr. Jett appealed his case to the Ninth Circuit 
and that court reversed the district court opinion and remanded the case (three and a half years 
after Mr. Jett first filed his case) that Mr. Jett received assistance from counsel. Jett v. Penner,  
439 F.3d 1091, 1095–96 (9th Cir. 2006). The parties later settled the case after the judge denied 
the defendants’ second motion for summary judgment. SeeJett v. Penner, Case No. 02-2036, 
Doc. Nos. 153 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2007), 159 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2008). 
 24. See Kimberly J. Mueller, Inmates’ Civil Rights Cases and Appointment of Counsel, 
SACRAMENTO LAWYER, May/June 2006. Ninety percent of prisoners whose cases survive 
summary judgment also represent themselves at trial. Id. Judge Mueller, citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915 
(2006), notes “federal courts have no authority to require that an attorney accept appointment as 
an inmate civil rights plaintiff’s counsel” and attorneys have little to no incentive to take these 
cases because fees, which are provided for under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006), are not awarded until 
after trial or after appeal. Kimberly J. Mueller, Inmates’ Civil Rights Cases and Appointment of 
Counsel, SACRAMENTO LAW., May/June 2006.  
 25. ADMIN . OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: Mar. 
31, 2008, tbl. C-2 (2008),  available at http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2008/tables/C02Mar08. 
pdf. Table C-2 from 2008 suggests that over 17,000 of these cases involved state rather than 
federal prison systems. Id. (noting 1,049 of the prisoner civil rights cases were brought against 
the United States, while 17,250 cases were private “Federal Question” cases). 
 26. Mueller, supra note 24. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See Jenifer Warren, Judge Names Receiver to Fix Prison Health System, L.A. TIMES, 
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The cases discussed below represent some of these egregious facts. 
The Gonzalez case alleged the prison improperly classified a known 
violent inmate, exposing Officer Gonzalez to grave risk of harm.30 The 
three other cases, which I will call the “Eastern District Prison Cases,” 
allege improper medical care resulting in, variously, unnecessary 
surgeries, failure to perform surgery resulting in permanent 
disfigurement, extreme pain and loss of mobility, and loss of 
reproductive capacity.31 
A.  Estate of Gonzalez v. Hickman32 
In Estate of Gonzalez, the Eastern District of California held that the 
Eleventh Amendment and state sovereign immunity protect state 
agencies from being compelled to respond to discovery subpoenas in 
federal court.33 Gonzalez is the first published opinion on this issue. 
The Gonzalez plaintiffs sued several state prison employees under 
§ 1983.34 During discovery, the plaintiffs issued subpoenas to the 
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), the 
state agency responsible for managing the state prison system.35 The 
subpoenas sought documents and testimony regarding portions of the 
individual defendants’ employment and personnel files and information 
on the inmate who killed Mr. Gonzalez.36 The CDCR refused to comply 
with the subpoenas, so the plaintiffs filed a motion to compel 






                                                                                                                     
Feb. 15, 2006, at B1 (noting that “court-appointed inspectors told Judge Henderson last summer 
that they saw few signs of progress in a system that on average kills one inmate—through 
neglect or malpractice—each week”); see also Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. 01-1351, 2005 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8878, at *1, *7 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2005) (describing expert report on the 
state of the prison medical system produced three years after lawsuit was settled as “shocking” 
and noting experts “observed widespread evidence of medical malpractice and neglect” 
including finding thirty–four prisoner deaths “highly problematic, with multiple instances of 
incompetence, indifference, neglect, and even cruelty by medical staff”). 
 30. Estate of Gonzales v. Hickman, No. ED CV 05-660 MMM (RCx), 2007 WL 3237727, 
at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 30, 2007). 
 31. See infra Part II.B. 
 32. 466 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (E.D. Cal. 2006). 
 33. Id. at 1229–30. 
 34. Id. at 1226–27. 
 35. Estate of Gonzales v. Hickman, No. S06-0095 MCE GGH, 2006 WL 3201069, at *1 
(E.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2006). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
8
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The matter first came before Magistrate Judge Gregory G. Hollows, 
who held sovereign immunity applied to the subpoenas.38 In so doing, 
he relied on a Ninth Circuit case, United States v. James,39 that held 
tribal sovereign immunity barred subpoenas served by a criminal 
defendant to tribal entities.40 Although James addressed tribal and not 
state immunity and was a criminal case, Judge Hollows still found the 
case “closely analogous” and felt bound to follow it.41 However, he also 
found state sovereign immunity did not bar the subpoenas in the 
Gonzalez case for two reasons.42 First, the state unequivocally waived 
its immunity through a state statute that allows state employees to 
respond to subpoenas.43 Second, subpoenas were similar to injunctive 
relief, and therefore fit into the “Ex Parte Young” exception to 
sovereign immunity44 discussed further in Part III.D.1.45 Therefore, 
Judge Hollows granted the plaintiffs’ motion to compel.46 
The state filed a motion for reconsideration with District Court Judge 
Morrison C. England, who found the magistrate judge’s opinion 
contrary to law and overturned the ruling.47 In ruling on the motion, the 
district court never addressed the underlying questions of whether 
sovereign immunity applied to subpoenas in the first instance or 
whether a court should look to ribal sovereign immunity cases when 
analyzing a question of state sovereign immunity. It merely held that 
the two reasons for which the magistrate judge found sovereign 
immunity did not apply were both contrary to law: The California 
statute did not constitute an unequivocal waiver of immunity for a 
subpoena issued in federal court,48 and Ex Parte Young did not apply 
because the underlying lawsuit sought damages rather than injunctive 
relief.49 The court held that “Plaintiffs do not have a federal right to 
force the State to produce documents that, in a best case scenario, can 
only assist Plaintiffs in obtaining relief for a past wrong.”50  
                                                                                                                     
 38. Id. at *2. 
 39. 980 F. 2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1992). In James, the United States government brought a 
criminal action against a tribal member who then issued a subpoena to a tribal agency seeking 
documents helpful to his case. For further discussion of James, see infra Part V.C.  
 40. Gonzalez, 2006 WL 3201069, at *2. 
 41. Id. at *1. 
 42. Id. at *2–4. 
 43. Id. at *2 (citing CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68097.1(b)). 
 44. Id. at *3 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). 
 45. See infra Part III.D.1.a. 
 46. Gonzalez, 2006 WL 3201069, at *6. 
 47. Estate of Gonzalez v. Hickman, 466 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1229 (E.D. Cal. 2006). 
 48. Id. at 1228–29. 
 49. Id. at 1229. 
 50. Id. This statement is problematic because it conflates the relief sought in the litigation 
(damages for failure to prevent Mr. Gonzalez’s death) with the “relief” sought in response to the 
subpoenas and the motion to compel (documents necessary to prove the defendants failed to 
9
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B.  Three Eastern District Prison Cases Succeeding Gonzalez 
Although a later proceeding in the Gonzalez case questioned the 
holding above,51 the State of California relied on the opinion in fighting 
discovery requests in at least three subsequent federal civil rights cases 
brought in the Eastern District of California by inmates incarcerated in 
the California state prison system: Allen v. Woodford,52 Thomas v. 
Hickman,53 and Jett v. Penner54 (collectively the “Eastern District 
Prison Cases”). In all three cases, the prisoners brought claims under 
§ 1983 and the Eighth Amendment for cruel and unusual punishment 
arising out of improper medical care during their incarceration.55 I  
Allen and Thomas, the female prisoners alleged they were subjected to 
unnecessary surgeries, causing severe pain, loss of mobility (in Ms. 
Allen and her co-plaintiffs’ cases) and loss of reproductive capability 
(in Ms. Thomas’ case).56 They sued several state employees and officers 
                                                                                                                     
prevent Mr. Gonzalez’s death). 
 51. See Estate of Gonzalez v. Hickman, No. ED CV 05-660 MMM (RCx), 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 83702, at *4 n.5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007). The Gonzalez case was first filed in the 
Central District of California in 2005. Id. at *1–2. The plaintiffs issued subpoenas to the CDCR 
out of the Eastern District Court of California in 2006, resulting in the December 2006 decision 
denying the plaintiffs’ motion to compel, which is the subject of this Article. Id. at *3–4. 
However, the plaintiffs later issued subpoenas to the custodians of records at the prisons out of 
the Central District of California. Id. at *7. That court held that the state waived its immunity 
with respect to documents it provided to the defendants but not to the plaintiffs. Id. at *21–24. In 
doing so, the court questioned the Eastern District court’s holding, noting that the proposition 
“that the State enjoys subpoena immunity under the Eleventh Amendment . . . appears tenuous at 
best.” Id. at *4 n.5. 
 52. 544 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1075 (E.D. Cal. 2008). Another case, Scott v. Suryadevara, was 
joined with the Allen case for discovery purposes because it involved similar facts. See Third 
Amended Complaint, Scott v. Suryadevara, No. 1:05-CV-01282-OWW-WMW-PC, 2007 WL 
969232, at *1–3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2007). 
 53. No. CV F 06-0215 AWI SMS, 2008 WL 782476, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2008). 
 54. No. Civ S-02-2036 GEB JFM P., 2007 WL 127790, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2007). 
The state also argued the Gonzalez case applied in a fourth, non-prison case. S e Jones v. Tozzi, 
No. CV-F-05-148 OWW/DLB, 2007 WL1299795, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2007). The opinion 
in Jones is similar to that of the other three cases, so this Article will not focus on it. It is 
difficult to tell how many times the State of California has relied on Gonzalez in other cases 
outside these four, because courts rarely publish opinions addressing discovery disputes. 
 55. See Allen, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 1140; Thomas, 2008 WL 782476, at *1; Jett, 2007 WL 
127790, at *1. 
 56. Brenda Allen and the plaintiffs in the Scott case alleged the private doctor, under 
contract with the state prison system, unnecessarily removed their lymph nodes, muscle, tissue 
and skin under their arms as an invasive treatment for boils in their armpits. See Third Amended 
Complaint, Scott v. Suryadevara, 2007 WL 969232, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2007); Third 
Amended Complaint, Allen v. Woodford, No. 1:05-cv-01104-OWW-NEW, at *11 (E.D. Cal. 
Feb. 2, 2007). The plaintiffs in both Allen and Scott alleged that the private doctor had a 
financial incentive for performing unneeded surgeries on inmates, and they had evidence that 
the state defendants knew several years prior to the surgeries that there were many complaints 
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for their failure to prevent the improper surgeries, and sued several 
private parties, including the private doctors who performed the 
surgeries.57 In Jett, the inmate alleged the defendants failed to treat him 
properly for a fractured thumb, resulting in loss of movement in his 
dominant hand and constant pain, and similarly sued state employee 
doctors and prison officials responsible for his care.58 All cases were 
“individual capacity” suits against the state defendants, meaning the 
plaintiffs, similar to the Gonzalez case, sued the state employees for 
damages (rather than injunctive relief) for personal actions they took as 
individuals rather than as representatives of the state.59 
The plaintiffs in each case served discovery requests for documents 
necessary to prove their cases on either the state defendants or 
nonparties such as the state employee custodians of records at the 
prisons where the plaintiffs were incarcerated.60 In each of the three 
cases, the court held the plaintiffs were entitled to the documents, 
though for different reasons.61 However, the State of California has 
                                                                                                                     
about the private doctor. See Third Amended Complaint, Scott v. Suryadevara, 2007 WL 
969232, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2007); Third Amended Complaint, Allen v. Woodford, 2007 
WL 969230, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2007). Kelli Thomas alleged doctors removed her ovaries 
without her consent and without her knowledge that the surgery would result in her sterilization. 
Corrected First Amended Complaint, Thomas v. Suryadevara, No. 1:06-cv-00215-AWI-SMS, 
2006 WL 3881260, at 5–7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2006). Thomas was twenty-four at the time of the 
surgery. Id. at 5. 
 57. See Third Amended Complaint, Scott v. Suryadevara, 2007 WL 969232, at *1–3 (E.D. 
Cal. Feb. 5, 2007); Third Amended Complaint, Allen v. Woodford, 2007 WL 969230, at *1–3 
(E.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2007); Corrected First Amended Complaint, Thomas v. Suryadevara, 2006 
WL 3881260 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2006). 
 58. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1093–95. 
 59. The distinction between suits against state employees acting in their individual or 
personal capacities versus official capacities can be quite confusing. In both cases, the 
employees are considered “state actors” (acting under color of state law) for purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and in both, the state actor is accused of depriving another of a federal 
right. However, in “official capacity suits,” the state actor is acting as an agent of the state (a 
stand-in for the state), and therefore if she left office her successor could stand in her place in 
the lawsuit. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). In contrast, in “individual capacity” 
suits, the plaintiff must prove the state actor was personally responsible for the alleged 
deprivation. Id. The other main difference between the two types of cases shows up in the relief 
available to the plaintiff. A plaintiff who sues a state officer in her official capacity may only 
receive prospective injunctive relief as a remedy, whereas damages are an available remedy for 
an individual capacity suit.  
 60. See Allen, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 1075; Thomas, 2008 WL 782476, at *1; Jett, 2007 WL 
127790, at *1. 
 61. In Jett, the court relied on United States v. James, 980 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1992), to 
find that the state waived its immunity as to documents it had already provided to the defendants 
but not to the plaintiff. 2007 WL 127790, at *1–2. In Thomas, the court cited to James but 
allowed the subpoenas to proceed because they were issued to individuals rather than the state 
itself and because complying with the subpoenas would not “result in a judgment against the 
state that would be paid out of the state’s treasury.” 2007 WL 4302974, at *2. Finally, in A len, 
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challenged that ruling on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. 
III.   THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY  
The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution contains basic 
principles of the state sovereign immunity doctrine and states, “The 
judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to 
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of 
any foreign State.”62 
However, state sovereign immunity is not limited to the text of the 
amendment. The Supreme Court has held that “the sovereign immunity 
of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the 
Eleventh Amendment.”63 Instead, immunity “‘is a fundamental aspect 
of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the 
Constitution and which they retain today . . . except as altered by the 
plan of the Convention or certain constitutional Amendments.’”64 The 
Parts below will provide a brief introduction to the history of the state 
sovereign immunity doctrine and will discuss its bounds in more 
detail.65  
A.  History and Ratification of the Eleventh Amendment 
The concept of state sovereign immunity precedes both the Eleventh 
Amendment and the drafting of the Constitution. It derives from English 
law and is based on the notion that, because God vested sovereignty in 
the King, “God’s sovereign agent on earth,”66 “the King can do no 
                                                                                                                     
the court allowed the subpoenas to proceed because it found a subpoena did not constitute a 
“lawsuit” for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. 544 F. Supp. 2d at 1078–79. Separately, the 
court noted in dicta that it did not find James controlling because it did not involve Eleventh 
Amendment immunity. Id. at 1079. 
 62. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 63. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999). For this reason, the Court has said that the 
phrase “Eleventh Amendment immunity,” sometimes used in lieu of “state sovereign immunity” 
is “something of a misnomer.” Id. 
 64. N. Ins. Co. v. Chatham County, 547 U.S. 189, 193 (2006) (quoting Alden, 527 U.S. at 
713). 
 65. For a more extensive analysis of the history of state sovereign immunity and the 
Eleventh Amendment, see CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNITY  (1972); 2 FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES 264–93 (Da Capo Press 1970) (1901); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and 
Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987) (discussing the history of sovereign immunity and the 
Eleventh Amendment); Fletcher, supra note 18, at 1033 (asserting the Eleventh Amendment did 
nothing to prohibit federal court jurisdiction); Rodolphe J.A. de Seife, Th  King is Dead, Long 
Live the King! The Court-Created American Concept of Immunity: The Negation of Equality 
and Accountability Under Law, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 981 (1996) (discussing the history of 
sovereign immunity and its obsolescence in modern American society). 
 66. Amar, supra note 65, at 1431. 
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wrong.”67  
This basis for the state sovereign immunity doctrine seems 
antithetical to a nation without a king and that was formed and ruled by 
and for the people. In fact, although state sovereign immunity was a 
concept well known to the Constitution’s Framers (it was discussed 
during the Philadelphia Convention and in The Federalist Papers),68 it 
was not included explicitly either in the body of the Constitution or in 
the later-ratified Bill of Rights. Instead, the text of Article III of the 
Constitution suggests the Constitution’s drafters did not intend  for the 
states to be immune from suit:  
The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the 
United States, and Treaties . . . between a State and 
Citizens of another State . . . and between a State, or the 
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.69 
The states did not demand their sovereign status be codified in the 
Constitution until the Supreme Court held in several cases, culminating 
in 1793 with Chisholm v. Georgia,70 that the Constitution provided 
federal courts with jurisdiction over suits against states.71 Several 
versions of a constitutional amendment overturning Chisholm were 
proposed within days of the decision,72 and the Eleventh Amendment 
was ratified in February 1795, only two years after the Chisholm 
opinion was handed down.73 The text of the Eleventh Amendment, 
which suggests immunity is limited to cases brought by citizens of other 
                                                                                                                     
 67. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 519 (3d ed. 2000). 
 68. See JACOBS, supra note 65, at 27–40. But cf. 2 THORPE, supra note 65, at 264–68 
(discussing contemporary interpretations of federal judicial power and concluding “the framers 
of the Constitution did not intend to make it possible to ‘drag a sovereign State before a federal 
court’”). Thorpe cites to John Marshall’s speech at the Virginia Convention: “With respect to 
disputes between a State and the citizens of another State, its jurisdiction has been decried with 
unusual vehemence. I hope that no gentlemen will think that a State will be called at the bar of a 
federal court.” Thorpe also cites Alexander Hamilton in Federalist Paper No. 81:  
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an 
individual without its own consent. This is the general sense, and the general 
practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, 
is now enjoyed by the government of every State in the Union.  
 69. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added). 
 70. 2 U.S. 419 (1793).  
 71. Id.; see also JACOBS, supra note 65, at 43–47 (discussing other cases which held that 
the Constitution provided federal courts with jurisdiction over suits against states); de Seife, 
supra note 65, at 1012 (discussing other cases which held that the Constitution provided federal 
courts with jurisdiction over suits against states). 
 72. Fletcher, supra note 18, at 1058–59. 
 73. Fletcher, supra note 18, at 1059. 
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or foreign states, responded directly to the facts of the C isholm case, 
and seems designed to limit the specific sections of federal court 
jurisdiction under Article III quoted above.74 It is not clear from the 
text, however, that the drafters intended the Eleventh Amendment to 
extend beyond those specific sections. 
B.  Subsequent Case Law Extending the Eleventh Amendment’s  
Reach 
Beginning in 1890 with Hans v. Louisiana,75 a case decided almost 
100 years after the Eleventh Amendment’s ratification, the Court began 
to extend sovereign immunity protection to various contexts outside the 
literal text of the amendment.76 For example, the Court has held in 
several cases that Eleventh Amendment immunity is not limited to suits 
brought by private citizens of another state or a foreign state.77 In Hans, 
the Supreme Court held that sovereign immunity barred a citizen from 
suing his own state.78 In Smith v. Reeves,79 the Court held that states are 
immune from suits brought by federal corporations.80 In Principality of 
Monaco v. Mississippi,81 the Court extended state sovereign immunity 
to suits brought by foreign nations.82 And in Blatchford v. Native 
Village of Noatak,83 the Court held sovereign immunity barred suits 
against states brought by Indian tribes.84 
Other cases have extended the forum in which the Eleventh 
Amendment applies. Although the Eleventh Amendment only discusses 
“the judicial power of the United States,”85 in Alden v. Maine,86 the 
Court held states immune from suit on federal claims brought in state 
court.87 And in Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State 
                                                                                                                     
 74. See Fletcher, supra note 18, at 1060 (discussing the different proposed versions of the 
amendment and noting the final version was less restrictive than earlier versions and was tied to 
specific language of Article III). In Chisholm, the plaintiff, a resident of South Carolina, sued 
the State of Georgia for non-payment for goods supplied to the state during the Revolutionary 
War. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 420. Georgia refused to appear in the case, claiming sovereign 
immunity protected it from suit. Id. 
 75. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
 76. Id. 
 77. See, e.g., id. 
 78. Id. at 20–21. 
 79. 178 U.S. 436 (1900). 
 80. Id. at 448–49. 
 81. 292 U.S. 313 (1934). 
 82. Id. at 325. 
 83. 501 U.S. 775 (1991). 
 84. Id. at 779–83. 
 85. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 86. 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 87. Id. at 757. 
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Ports Authority,88 the Court held that states cannot be named as 
defendants in federal administrative agency proceedings.89 Similarly, in 
Ex parte New York, the Court held that, although textually, the Eleventh 
Amendment only discusses suits in law or equity, sovereign immunity is 
also a defense to suits in admiralty.90 
Finally, several cases have extended the definition of what 
constitutes a “state” for purposes of sovereign immunity. Now, state 
agencies and entities that can be considered an “arm of the State” are 
also entitled to state sovereign immunity.91  
Therefore, it is now well-settled that no private party may bring an 
action under federal law against a state directly or against an agency or 
department or “arm” of the state in any forum unless the state has 
waived its immunity or Congress has abrogated that immunity.92 As the 
lower court stated in South Carolina State Ports Authority v. Federal 
Maritime Commission,93 “The lesson from ‘the Constitution’s structure, 
its history, and the authoritative interpretations’ by the Supreme Court is 
unmistakable—an adversarial proceeding against a non-consenting state 
by a private party triggers sovereign immunity.”94  
C.  Three Rationales for Why State Sovereign Immunity is Broader  
than the Text of the Eleventh Amendment 
Courts have used three main rationales to explain or justify the broad 
reach of sovereign immunity: (1) an “originalist” rationale, that the 
framers never intended to abrogate an immunity that existed before the 
ratification of the Constitution; (2) a “pragmatic” rationale, that 
sovereign immunity is necessary to curb the impact a flood of potential 
litigation would have on the state’s treasury; and, more recently, (3) a 
                                                                                                                     
 88. 535 U.S. 743 (2002). 
 89. Id. at 769. 
 90. 256 U.S. 490, 497–500 (1921). But cf. California. v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 
U.S. 491, 504–05 (1998) (distinguishing Ex parte New York and stating the Court has 
jurisdiction in admiralty proceedings where the state does not have the res (e.g., a vessel 
involved in a property dispute) in its possession). 
 91. See, e.g., Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 50 (1994) (“[W]here 
an agency is so structured that, as a practical matter, if the agency is to survive, a judgment must 
expend itself against state treasuries, common sense and the rationale of the Eleventh 
Amendment require that sovereign immunity attach to the agency.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 312–13 (1990) (Brennan, J., 
concurring); Stoner v. Santa Clara County Office of Educ., 502 F.3d 1116, 1122–23 (9th Cir. 
2007). 
 92. See William A. Fletcher, The Eleventh Amendment: Unfinished Business, 75 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 843, 857 (2000) (noting that after Alden v. Maine, “all nine Justices have 
abandoned any thought, or any pretense, that the text of the Eleventh Amendment matters”). 
 93. 243 F.3d 165, 172 (4th Cir. 2001), rev’d on other grounds by Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. 
S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002). 
 94. Id. at 172 (Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999)).  
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“dignity” rationale that immunity from suit is necessary to protect the 
states from an “affront” to their dignity.95 
Based in part on discussions of the federal judiciary power 
contemporaneous with the Constitution’s drafting, the originalist 
rationale concludes that sovereign immunity existed in its common law 
form before the country was founded and is therefore not limited to the 
text of the Eleventh Amendment.96 The Supreme Court’s statement in 
Alden v. Maine best represents this rationale: “States’ immunity from 
suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed 
before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain 
today.”97 
The second justification, the pragmatic approach,98 builds off the 
originalist rationale. Here, the courts look to pragmatic reasons for 
disallowing suits against the states. For example, in Alden v. Maine,99 
the Supreme Court noted that allowing suits for money damages might 
“threaten the financial integrity of the States”100 and “would place 
                                                                                                                     
 95. I am certainly not the first to try to bring order to the confusing Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on state sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Judicial Solicitude for 
State Dignity, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &  SOC. SCI. 81 (2001) (examining the Supreme 
Court’s “dignitary justification” in upholding sovereign immunity); Andrew B. Coan, Text as 
Truce: A Peace Proposal for the Supreme Court’s Costly War Over the Eleventh Amendment, 
74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2511 (2006); William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the 
Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261 (1989); Fletcher, supra note 
18. Lauren K. Robel, Sovereignty & Democracy: The States’ Obligations to Their Citizens 
Under Federal Statutory Law, 78 IND. L.J. 543 (2003) (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
controversial sovereign immunity decisions, how states should make sovereign immunity 
waiver decisions, and what constraints states face in waiving sovereign immunity). I have used 
the terms “originalist,” “pragmatic,” and “dignity” as shorthands to try to group and describe the 
various arguments. Others have used similar terms. See, e.g., Caminker, supra at 95 (calling the 
first two justifications “originalist” and “functionalist” and describing the “dignity” argument as 
either justificatory or “rhetorical flourish”). 
 96. See, e.g., Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322–26 (1934) 
(discussing debates at the Constitutional Convention); see also 2 THORPE, supra note 65, at 288–
89. The originalist approach to Eleventh Amendment interpretation seems to go against 
accepted principles of statutory interpretation because it completely ignores the plain language 
of the Amendment itself. Justice Felix Frankfurter once noted ironically in discussing statutory 
interpretation that “only when legislative history is doubtful do you go to the statute.” Felix 
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 543 (1947). 
The “originalist” approach to Eleventh Amendment analysis seems to take Justice Frankfurter’s 
statement at its word. 
 97. 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999); see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18 (1890) (noting 
that the Constitution did not “raise up” any proceedings against the States that were “anomalous 
and unheard of when the Constitution was adopted” and holding that, despite the limited text of 
the Eleventh Amendment, a state cannot be sued in federal court by its own citizens). 
 98. As noted, Caminker calls this the “functionalist” justification. See Caminker, supra 
note 95, at 83. 
 99. 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 100. Id. at 750. 
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unwarranted strain on the States’ ability to govern in accordance with 
the will of their citizens” because it would interfere with the states’ 
capacity to allocate their own “scarce resources among competing needs 
and interests [which] lies at the heart of the political process.”101 This 
approach seems to be based at least in part on the belief that, at the time 
the Eleventh Amendment was ratified, the states had been devastated by 
the financial burden of fighting the Revolutionary War and that there 
was a real fear that if states could be subject to suit on Revolutionary 
War debts in the courts of the new federal government, this could 
bankrupt the states.102 Thus, it is pragmatic to extend the Eleventh 
Amendment to other adversarial proceedings that would also implicate a 
state’s treasury or its ability to choose how to allocate its own scarce 
resources, such as suits in state courts (as in Alden)103 or federal agency 
actions (as in South Carolina State Ports Authority).104 
In the past two decades the Court has increasingly relied on a third 
justification to support extending state sovereign immunity to contexts 
                                                                                                                     
 101. Id. at 750–51. One could argue that Hamilton’s THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 also presents 
a pragmatic justification for state sovereign immunity:  
To what purpose would it be to authorize suits against States, for the debts they 
owe? How could recoveries be enforced? It is evident that it could not be done 
without waging war against the contracting State; and to ascribe to the federal 
courts by mere implication, and in destruction of a preexisting right of the State 
governments, a power which would involve such a consequence, would be 
altogether forced and unwarrantable. 
 102. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 750 (“It is indisputable that, at the time of the founding, 
many of the States could have been forced into insolvency but for their immunity from private 
suits for money damages.”); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821) (“[A]t the 
adoption of the constitution, all the States were greatly indebted[] and[,] the apprehension that 
these debts might be prosecuted in the federal Courts, formed a very serious objection to that 
instrument.”). This view has been called into question by at least one scholar who notes that, 
between the time the Constitution was ratified in 1787 and the date the Eleventh Amendment 
was ratified in 1794,  
over two-thirds of the debts of the states had been assumed by the federal 
government, and the state governments, for the most part, were able and willing 
to meet their remaining obligations. . . . Moreover, during the 1790s and the 
ensuing decade, practically all of this indebtedness was discharged, partly out 
of state revenues and partly from federal credits, as wartime accounts between 
the states and the central government were settled. 
JACOBS, supra note 65, at 69. But cf. 1 TRIBE, supra note 67, 521; de Seife, supra note 65, at 
1024–25. 
 103. 527 U.S. at 712. 
 104. 535 U.S. 743, 748–50 (2002). This argument is difficult to justify because actions for 
prospective or equitable relief pursuant to the line of cases following Ex parte Young, discussed 
further in Part III.D.1, surely implicate a state’s treasury and force a state to allocate its scarce 
funds in ways it may not have chosen through its own political process. Nevertheless, these 
cases are constitutionally cognizable. 
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outside the text of the Eleventh Amendment—what I call a “dignity” 
rationale. In this approach, the Court notes that protecting the states 
from adversary proceedings based on sovereign immunity serves the 
states’ “dignity interests” accorded to them as sovereigns independent 
from and coextensive with the federal government.105 For example, in 
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the Court noted the “Eleventh 
Amendment does not exist solely in order to preven[t] federal-court 
judgments that must be paid out of a State’s treasury, it also serves to 
avoid the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of 
judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties.”106 In Alden, the 
Court cited Seminole Tribe and reiterated that “[p]rivate suits against 
nonconsenting States . . . present the indignity of subjecting a State to 
the coercive process of judicial tribunals . . . regardless of the forum.”107 
Although the Court rejected the dignity rationale in Cohens v. 
Virginia,108 one of its earliest cases addressing state sovereign immunity 
under the Eleventh Amendment, it now appears to have taken firm hold. 
In cases such as Alden109 or Seminole Tribe110 it still could be argued 
that the Court’s use of this dignity rationale was purely rhetorical 
support for the originalist or pragmatic rationales.111 However, in 2002, 
the Court in South Carolina State Ports Authority seemed to 
                                                                                                                     
 105. See, e.g., id. at 760. Despite the fact that the Court has seemed to rely on this theory 
more in the last two decades, it is not new. In In re Ayers, the Court held “The very object and 
purpose of the 11th amendment were to prevent the indignity of subjecting a state to the 
coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties.” 123 U.S. 443, 505 
(1887). But, as early as 1946, scholars have taken issue with this rationale. See Joseph D. Block, 
Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59 HARV. L. REV. 
1060, 1060–61 (1946) (“[T]he indignity of subjecting a government to judicial process at the 
instance of private parties seems to be an objection lacking in force, however substantial a 
consideration it might have been in the times when state and federal governments were less 
solidly established than they are now.”). And Justice Stevens has consistently dissented to 
opinions based on this rationale, noting it “is an ‘embarrassingly insufficient’ rationale for the 
rule [extending Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity].” Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 
U.S. 44, 97 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); s e also S.C. State Ports Auth., 
535 U.S. at 770 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Puerto Ric  Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & 
Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 151 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 106. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 58 (alteration in original) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). 
 107. Alden, 527 U.S. at 749  (citing Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 58) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 108. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821) (“[The Eleventh Amendment] does not 
comprehend controversies between two or more States, or between a State and a foreign State. 
The jurisdiction of the Court still extends to these cases: and in these a State may still be sued. 
We must ascribe the amendment, then, to some other cause than the dignity of a State.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 109. Alden, 527 U.S. at 715. 
 110. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996). 
 111. See Caminker, supra note 95, at 83. 
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subordinate both arguments to the “dignity” rationale, holding, “The 
preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States the 
dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign entities.”112 
The dignity rationale will be important in the discovery context 
because, if taken to its extreme, it has the potential to undermine any 
action even tangentially involving the state.113 The State of California’s 
attorneys have relied heavily on this rationale in fighting the discovery 
requests in the Eastern District Prison Cases discussed in this Article.114 
D. Sovereign Immunity is Not Unlimited 
Despite the language of the Supreme Court cases discussed above, 
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment “is not 
absolute,”115 as the Supreme Court has limited its scope in several 
contexts. Three of these limitations are well-established. First, sovereign 
immunity does not extend to protect state employees if they are sued 
either in their official capacities for injunctive relief or in their 
individual capacities for money damages. 116 Second, Congress may 
abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity in limited circumstances. And 
third, states may waive their immunity. I propose a fourth limit: while 
sovereign immunity may apply as a direct defense to a suit or other 
adversarial proceeding brought against a state, it does not apply in 
proceedings ancillary or subordinate to the main suit, such as discovery 
requests issued to a state entity. Each of these limitations is discussed 
                                                                                                                     
 112. 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002). The Supreme Court has consistently applied the dignity 
rationale even outside the state sovereign immunity context. In the 2008 term, the Court in 
Republic of the Philippines v. Pimentel noted that the Republic of the Philippines’ sovereign 
“dignity interests” prevented the district court from hearing an interpleader action involving the 
Republic. 128 S. Ct. 2180, 2189–90 (2008). 
 113. For further discussion, see infra Part VI.B. 
 114. See, e.g., Non-Parties’ Oppostion to Plaintif’s Motion to Compel Production of 
Documents, Allen v. Woodford, No. 1:05-CV-01104-OWW-GSA, 2008 WL 117906, at 6–11 
(E.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 2008); Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Non-Parties to Produce 
Documents Pursuant to Subpoenas, Thomas v. Hickman, No. 06-00215, Docket No. 92, at 4 
(E.D. Cal. May 29, 2007). 
 115. Fla. Dep’t of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 690 n.27 (1982). 
 116. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 
232, 237 (1974). The Supreme Court and federal appellate courts have also refused to extend 
sovereign immunity to political subdivisions such as counties and municipalities or to state-
created and quasi-governmental entities, such as private companies, that have contracts with the 
state or public corporations. See, e.g., N. Ins. Co. v. Chatham County, 547 U.S. 189 (2006) 
(holding state sovereign immunity does not extend to counties); Fresenius Med. Care 
Cardiovascular Res. Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 322 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that state 
sovereign immunity does not extend to public corporations); del Campo v. Kennedy, No. 07-
15048, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 2559, *11–12 (9th Cir. Feb. 6, 2008) (holding that state 
sovereign immunity does not extend to private entities under contract with the state). 
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below.117  
1.  Three Established Checks on State Sovereign Immunity  
a.  Sovereign Immunity Does Not Apply to Most Suits Against 
State Officers and Employees 
In many early cases, the Supreme Court, in trying to find a remedy 
for private parties harmed by the states’ actions, allowed plaintiffs to 
sue state officers and employees where sovereign immunity prevented 
the plaintiffs from suing the state directly.118 The rationale for these 
early decisions is muddled but is, in general, based on an interpretation 
of federal court powers under the Constitution’s Contract Clause.119 
This line of cases allowing suits to proceed against state officers 
culminated in a (somewhat) clear standard, enunciated in 1908 in Ex
Parte Young, that state officials may be sued in their official capacities 
for injunctive relief where the court determines the official has been 
trying to enforce an unconstitutional state law.120 In Ex Parte Young, the 
Court held that a state officer who tries to enforce such a law  
comes into conflict with the superior authority of that 
Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or 
representative character and is subjected in his person to 
the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has 
no power to impart to him any immunity from 
responsibility to the supreme authority of the United 
States.121  
Without explicitly holding so, Ex parte Young attempted to 
harmonize the Eleventh Amendment with the substantive rights 
guaranteed by the later-ratified Fourteenth Amendment.122 I s holding, 
that a state official acting in his capacity as an officer of the state is 
divested of any residual state immunity by virtue of his unconstitutional 
actions, reinforces and gives teeth to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment:  
 
                                                                                                                     
 117. The Court has carved out several other exceptions that are beyond the scope of this 
Article. For an overview, see 1 TRIBE, supra note 67, at 519–66. 
 118. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Macon R.R., 109 U.S. 446, 450–52 (1883); Board of 
Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531, 541 (1876); Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. 203, 220 (1873); 
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738, 870 (1824); United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. 
115 (1809). 
 119. See JACOBS, supra note 65, at 124. 
 120. 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1988). 
 121. Id.  
 122. See JACOBS, supra note 65, at 142–43. 
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No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.123 
In the 1970s, the Supreme Court took its holding in Ex Parte Young 
a step further. In Scheuer v. Rhodes, decided in 1974, the Court 
reiterated that states may not immunize officers from suit in federal 
court124 and held a private litigant may sue a state official or employee 
for damages for actions that employee took in his individual capacity.125 
In between Young and Scheuer, the Court, in the 1961 case of 
Monroe v. Pape,126 gave full weight to the civil rights protections first 
delineated in the Civil Rights Act (Ku Klux Klan Act) of 1871, which is 
now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Civil Rights Act, also known as 
§ 1983, allows individuals to sue state actors127 in state or federal courts 
for acts that deprive them of “any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws.”128 Section 1983 does not create a 
substantive right but instead lays out the procedures by which one may 
make a constitutional claim against a state actor. In Mo roe, the Court 
held that Congress intended the Civil Rights Act “to give a remedy to 
parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by 
                                                                                                                     
 123. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. In the years since Ex parte Young the Court has 
clarified (to some extent) that lawsuits against state officers in their official capacity may only 
proceed if the suit is for “prospective” relief. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663–67 
(1974) (finding an award for monetary relief to welfare plaintiffs for wrongful denial of benefits 
was not prospective relief within the meaning of Ex parte Young); Verizon Md., Inc. v. PSC, 
535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (noting “[i]n determining whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young 
avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a ‘straightforward inquiry 
into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief 
properly characterized as prospective.’” (citing Idaho v. Coeur d’ Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 
U.S. 261, 296 (1997))). 
 124. 416 U.S. 232, 237 (1974) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908)). 
 125. Id. at 238. The Court later limited the reach of Ex parte Young and Scheuer when it 
held in Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989), that state officials may not 
be sued for damages under § 1983 for actions taken in their offic al capacities, because these 
officials are merely stand-ins for the state and are therefore not “persons” within the meaning of 
§ 1983.  
 126. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
 127. “State actors” are those who act “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
However, they need not be employed by the state. Se  generally Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 
398 U.S. 144, 220–21 (1970) (holding plaintiff could state a claim against a private party for 
violation of her civil rights pursuant to § 1983 if the private party acted in concert with state 
officials in violating her constitutional rights). 
 128. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). 
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an official’s abuse of his position.”129 In allowing the case to proceed, 
the Court recognized three principal purposes of the Civil Rights Act. 
First, it overrode certain state laws; second, it provided a “remedy 
where state law was inadequate;” and third, it provided “a federal 
remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in theory[,] was not 
available in practice.”130 
In Scheuer, which succeeded Monroe by thirteen years, the Court 
acknowledged Monroe and noted that “[i]n some situations a damage 
remedy can be as effective a redress for the infringement of a 
constitutional right as injunctive relief might be in another.”131 The 
Court held that such an action, “seeking to impose individual and 
personal liability on the named defendants for . . . a deprivation of 
federal rights by these defendants under color of state law” was not 
barred by the Eleventh Amendment.132 The holding in Scheuer has 
allowed many civil rights plaintiffs to sue state officers where those 
officers have violated a person’s constitutional rights but injunctive 
relief is not an option (for example, in cases where the constitutional 
violations occurred in the past and are not ongoing). Scheuer is 
applicable to the Eastern District Prison Cases because the plaintiffs in 
those cases were not subject to ongoing harm—they alleged state 
employees violated their civil rights by subjecting them to improper and 
illegal medical care in the past, rather than on an ongoing basis, and 
therefore injunctive relief was not an available remedy.  
b.  Congress May Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity by Creating a 
Private Right of Action Against the States 
Congress can abrogate sovereign immunity in a few limited contexts 
by passing laws that create a private right of action against the states.133 
However, it must do so “pursuant to a valid exercise of power” and 
                                                                                                                     
 129. 365 U.S. at 172.  
 130. Id. at 173–74. 
 131. 416 U.S. 232, 238 (1974). 
 132. Id. The Court, in Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25–31 (1991), reiterated and attempted 
to clarify this holding and harmonize it with Ex parte Young and Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State 
Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). The Court distinguished between suits for damages against a state 
officer for actions that officer took while acting in her official capacity (acting “under color of 
state law” for purposes of § 1983) and suits for damages where the officer is su d n her official 
capacity (i.e., not for specific actions she herself took against the plaintiff but for her role as an 
officer of the state). Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25–31. The Court reiterated that the Eleventh 
Amendment does not bar suits for damages against a state officer for actions that officer takes 
while acting in her “official capacity;” instead it bars lawsuits where the state officer is sued in 
her official capacity (and thus she is merely a stand-in for the state). Id. at 29–31. 
 133. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (“In [§ 5] Congress is expressly 
granted authority to enforce . . . the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment” by 
providing actions for money damages against the States.). 
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must have “unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the 
immunity.”134 The Court has sharply constrained this power in the past 
few decades. Where once the Court held that Congress could create a 
private right of action under its Article I Interstate Commerce Clause 
powers,135 the Court limited that power in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. 
Florida136 to statutes passed pursuant to Congress’ Fourteenth 
Amendment, § 5 authority.137 
Any legislation that attempts to abrogate immunity must be 
“unmistakably clear” in the actual text of the statute138—a general 
authorization to file a suit in the federal courts is not enough.139 
c.  States May Waive Their Immunity 
Even though the Supreme Court has strengthened its Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence in the last couple decades and has continued 
to limit Congress’ ability to create private rights of action for damages 
                                                                                                                     
 134. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (citation omitted).  
 135. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 23 (1989). 
 136. 517 U.S. 44, 73–74 (1996); see also MELVYN R. DURCHSLAG, STATE SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNITY 106 (2002) (noting that “it is probably fair to say that until Seminole Tribe of Florida 
v. Florida (1996), the Supreme Court assumed that Congress did possess the power to abrogate 
state sovereign immunity as a means of enforcing its legislative authorities under Article I, 
§ 8”). 
 137. See, e.g., United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 157–59 (2006) (Congress validly 
abrogated sovereign immunity by creating a private cause of action under Americans with 
Disabilities Act for damages against the states for conduct that violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 724–26 (2005) (same as to the 
Family Medical Leave Act). But cf. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519–20, 531 (1997) 
(holding that valid § 5 legislation must show “a congruence and proportionality between the 
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end” and that Congress 
exceeded its § 5 enforcement powers in enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
because the act was “so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it 
cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior”). 
Recently, in United States v. Georgia, the Court clarified that claims must be for actual 
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. 546 U.S. 151, 158–59 (2006) (emphasizing that state 
conduct must “actually” violate the Fourteenth Amendment). For further analysis of what 
legislation is “appropriate” under § 5, as well as a discussion of Congress’ Article I powers, see 
generally Joseph M. Pellicciotti & Michael J. Pellicciotti, Sovereign Immunity & 
Congressionally Authorized Private Party Actions Against the States for Violation of Federal 
Law: A Consideration of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decade Long Decisional Trek, 1996-2006, 
59 BAYLOR L. REV. 623 (2007). 
 138. Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228, 230 (1989) (“Legislative history generally will 
be irrelevant to a judicial inquiry into whether Congress intended to abrogate the Eleventh 
Amendment. If Congress’ intention is ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute,’ 
recourse to legislative history will be unnecessary; if Congress’ intention is not unmistakably 
clear, recourse to legislative history will be futile, because by definition the rule [that 
“Congress’ intention is ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute,’”] will not be met.”) 
(quoting, in part, Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)). 
 139. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 246. 
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against states, states may still waive their own immunity and consent to 
be sued.140 However, there are clear limitations on waiver. First, a 
state’s waiver must be voluntary.141 For example, if a state consents to 
be a party in a litigation, either by filing the suit, intervening in an 
existing suit, or removing a suit to federal court, it voluntarily waives its 
immunity by consenting to the court’s jurisdiction.142 But if the state 
consents to suit through statute, it “may  prescribe the terms and 
conditions on which it consents to be sued, and the manner in which the 
suit shall be conducted.”143 It may also “withdraw its consent whenever 
it may suppose that justice to the public requires it.”144 Second, waiver 
must be unequivocal;145 a state cannot “constructively” or “impliedly” 
waive its immunity.146 Nor does a state waive its immunity for federal 
court jurisdiction merely by consenting to be sued in its own courts, by 
stating its intention to “sue and be sued,” or by “authorizing suits 
                                                                                                                     
 140. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 737 (1999). Some scholars have argued waiver is the 
best hope for suits against the states. See, e.g., Lauren K. Robel, Sovereignty and Democracy: 
The States’ Obligations to Their Citizens Under Federal Statutory Law, 78 IND. L.J. 543 (2003) 
(exploring how states should make waiver decisions); Hien Ngoc Nguyen, Comment, Under 
Construction: Fairness, Waiver, and Hypothetical Eleventh Amendment Jurisdiction, 93 CAL. L. 
REV. 587 (2003) (discussing waiver and arguing the waiver doctrine is ripe for change). 
 141. See, e.g., Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. 527, 529 (1858) (noting the decision to waive 
immunity “is altogether voluntary on the part of the sovereignty” and a state may “withdraw its 
consent [to suit] whenever it may suppose that justice to the public requires it”). 
 142. Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447–48 (1883) (finding a state’s “voluntary 
appearance” in federal court as an intervener avoids Eleventh Amendment inquiry); Gunter v. 
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906) (“[W]here a State voluntarily becomes a 
party to a cause and submits its rights for judicial determination, it will be bound thereby and 
cannot escape the result of its own voluntary act by invoking the prohibitions of the Eleventh 
Amendment.”); see also Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 624 (2002) (holding that a 
state waives its immunity by removing a case to federal court when a state statute waives the 
state’s immunity from suit in its own courts, even where that case involves money damages 
against the state). Lapides notes that this part of the waiver rule is based a on a theory of 
consistency and fairness and that to not find waiver in these situations “would permit States to 
achieve unfair tactical advantages [.]” Id. at 621 (citing Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 
381, 393–94, 398 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 143. Beers, 61 U.S. at 529. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984) (insisting the 
state’s consent to suit must be “unequivocally expressed”). 
 146. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 
679–81 (1999); see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (“The mere fact that a 
State participates in a program through which the Federal Government provides assistance for 
the operation by the State of a system of public aid is not sufficient to establish consent on the 
part of the State to be sued in the federal courts.”); TRIBE, supra note 67, at 533 n.92 (noting that 
while state waiver is strictly construed, federal waiver of immunity, in contrast, is construed 
liberally (citing Hoffman v. Conn. Dep’t of Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96, 114 (1989) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting))) . 
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against it ‘in any court of competent jurisdiction.’”147 And finally, a 
state does not waive its immunity by failing to assert it by a certain 
point in any litigation; immunity may be asserted at any time, even for 
the first time on appeal.148  
2.  A New Fourth Check: Sovereign Immunity Does Not Apply to 
Proceedings That Are Ancillary or Subordinate to the Main Suit 
I propose a fourth check exists on state sovereign immunity that has 
not received much focus in academic circles or court cases, but is 
especially relevant to the issues addressed in this Article: A state may 
only raise a sovereign immunity defense when it is a party to a lawsuit 
or similar adversarial proceeding. If the state is not a party to the suit 
and is only brought into the case for an ancillary reason such as 
discovery, sovereign immunity is not a cognizable defense. 
The text of the Eleventh Amendment itself sustains this theory 
because it limits state sovereign immunity to “any suit in law or equity, 
commenced or prosecuted against” one of the states.149 Clyde Jacobs 
notes that the choice of the word “suit” rather than “case” or 
“controversy” (which are both terms used in Article III to define judicial 
power) and the limitation that the “suit” must be “prosecuted” indicates 
the framers intended to limit the reach of the Eleventh Amendment to 
actual lawsuits brought by an individual against a state.150 
The Federalist Papers and discussions preceding the ratification of 
the Constitution (both of which the Supreme Court has relied upon in 
recent state sovereign immunity cases) support this interpretation. 
Alexander Hamilton stated in Federalist Paper 81, “It is inherent in the 
nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual 
without its consent.”151 And John Marshall stated at the Virginia 
                                                                                                                     
 147. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 676 (citing Fla. Dep’t of Health and Rehab. Servs. v. Fla. 
Nursing Home Ass’n., 450 U.S. 147, 149–50 (1981) (per curiam)); see also CAL. GOV’ T CODE 
§ 68097.1(b). This statute was referenced in Estate of Gonzalez v. Hickman which the court 
found did not waive the state’s immunity for the purposes of a subpoena. 466 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 
1227, 1229 (E.D. Cal. 2006). 
 148. Halderman, 465 U.S. at n.8 (“The limitation deprives federal courts of any jurisdiction 
to entertain such claims, and thus may be raised at any point in a proceeding.”); Edelman, 415 
U.S. at 678 (noting that an Eleventh Amendment defense “need not be raised in the trial 
court[]”). Although a state may raise immunity as a defense at any time, a court need not raise it 
sua sponte. See, e.g., Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of the State of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 516 n.19 (1982). 
 149. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (emphasis added). 
 150. JACOBS, supra note 65, at 93. Jacobs does not focus on the question of what a “suit” is 
for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment but instead discusses whether the Eleventh 
Amendment was intended to be limited to cases brought in federal court on diversity jurisdiction 
or whether the framers intended to include federal question cases. Id. at 93–97. For more on this 
topic, see TRIBE, supra note 67, at 529–34. 
 151. TRIBE, supra note 67, at 716, 719 (emphasis added). 
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Convention, in the context of the question of whether a state could be 
made a defendant in an action brought by a private party, “I hope that 
no gentlemen will think that a State will be called at the bar of a federal 
court.”152 As the Supreme Court later noted in Alden v. Maine,153 “the 
state conventions . . . made clear that they, like Hamilton, Madison, and 
Marshall, understood the Constitution as drafted to preserve the States’ 
immunity from private suits.”154 As Justice Iredell famously dissented in 
Chisholm v. Georgia155 (in which a citizen of South Carolina brought 
suit against the state of Georgia): 
I believe there is no doubt that neither in the State now in 
question, nor in any other in the Union, any particular 
Legislative mode, authorizing a compulsory suit for the 
recovery of money against a State, was in being either 
when the Constitution was adopted, or at the time the 
judicial act was passed156 
Later, in Hans v. Louisiana157 when the Court extended sovereign 
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to cover suits brought by a 
citizen against his own state in federal court, the Court noted, “The 
suability of a State, without its consent, was a thing unknown to the law. 
This has been so often laid down and acknowledged by courts and 
jurists that it is hardly necessary to be formally asserted.”158 
The Court has defined the scope of a suit in several cases. In Cohens 
v. Virginia,159 the defendants, who were convicted by a state court for 
selling lottery tickets, brought a writ of error in the Supreme Court.160 
While this case is best remembered for its holding that the Supreme 
Court has the right to review a state supreme court’s ruling when it 
raises federal constitutional issues, the Court also addressed Virginia’s 
                                                                                                                     
 152. 2 THORPE, supra note 65, at 266; see also id. at 268 (concluding that the Constitution’s 
framers believed “that the Constitution guaranteed every State against being made defendant in 
any action that might be brought”). 
 153. 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 154. Id. at 718 (emphasis added). 
 155. 2 U.S. 419 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting). 
 156. Id. at 434–35 (emphasis added). Even Chief Justice Jay, writing as part of the majority 
in Chisholm, described the question before the Court as “Is a State su ble by individual citizens 
of another State?” Id. at 469 (emphasis added). 
 157. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
 158. Id. at 16 (emphasis added). 
 159. 19 U.S. 264 (1821). 
 160. When a party brings a “writ of error,” it asks the judges of one court “to examine a 
record upon which a judgment was given in another Court, and, on such examination, to affirm 
or reverse the same according to law.” Id  at 409. Cohens is best remembered for its holding that 
the Supreme Court has the right to review a state supreme court’s ruling when that court’s 
decision raises federal constitutional issues. 
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claim the Eleventh Amendment protected it from being haled into the 
Supreme Court on the writ. In determining the Eleventh Amendment 
did not bar the writ, the Court noted that the Eleventh Amendment 
“extended to suits commenced or prosecuted by individuals” and 
defined a suit as “the prosecution, or pursuit, of some claim, demand, or 
request.”161 Chief Justice Marshall continued: “To commence a suit, is 
to demand something by the institution of process in a Court of justice, 
and to prosecute the suit, is, according to the common acceptation of 
language, to continue that demand.”162 A writ of error was not a suit 
because it did not compel the state to come before the court; instead it 
was the process by which the superior court reviewed the judgment of 
the inferior court. It was not a demand by the private party against the 
state and did not create an assertion of a claim against the state.163 
Over 150 years later in Dugan v. Rank, the Court again looked at 
what constituted a “suit” for purposes of sovereign immunity and found 
it depended on the effect of the judgment sought.164 The Court noted  
The general rule is that a suit is against the sovereign if ‘the 
judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury 
or domain, or interfere with the public administration,’ or if 
the effect of the judgment would be ‘to restrain the 
Government from acting, or to compel it to act.’165  
 
                                                                                                                     
 161. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 407. 
 162. Id. at 408. 
 163. Id. at 410–11. Justice Marshall noted that “writs of error, accompanied with citations, 
have uniformly issued for the removal of judgments in favour of the United States into a 
superior Court. . . . It has never been suggested, that such writ of error was a suit against the 
United States . . . .” Id. at 412. The Court held that the writ only constituted a “suit or action 
when it is to restore the party who obtains it to the possession of any thing which is withheld 
from him.” Id. at 409–10. It is “not [a suit] when its operation is entirely defensive,” such as in 
Cohens, where the state instituted the suit and the party bringing the writ of error was a 
defendant to that action. Id. at 410. 
 164. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963). The issue in Dugan was whether a case 
brought against several government officials was really a case against the sovereign—the United 
States. Id. at 617. However, it is still instructive in defining what constitutes a “suit.” While 
Dugan addressed federal sovereign immunity rather than state immunity, it has been cited in 
several state sovereign immunity cases. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 
465 U.S. 89, 101 n.11 (1984); Palomar Pomerado Health Sys. v. Belshe, 180 F.3d 1104, 1108 
(9th Cir. 1999); Blaylock v. Schwinden, 862 F.2d 1352, 1353 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 165. Dugan, 372 U.S. at 620 (quoting Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947); Larson v. 
Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949); Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 
490, 502 (1921)). But cf. Boron Oil Co. v. Downie, 873 F.2d 67, 71 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing 
Dugan and holding sovereign immunity applies to subpoenas because a subpoena “‘interfere[s] 
with the public administration’ and compels the federal agency to act in a manner different from 
that in which the agency would ordinarily choose to exercise its public function”). 
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Finally, in Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State 
Ports Authority,166 in which the Court held sovereign immunity barred a 
private party’s complaint filed with the Federal Maritime Commission 
against the state port authority, the Court again, though somewhat 
indirectly, addressed what constitutes a “suit” for purposes of state 
sovereign immunity.167 The Court held that a state’s sovereign 
immunity protects it from federal administrative agency proceedings 
because such proceedings are so similar to a lawsuit filed in a court—
for example, both are adversarial and presided over by a judge, and both 
begin with the filing of a complaint, to which the defendant must 
respond with an answer or motion to dismiss or face default judgment 
for failure to respond.168 
In contrast, the Court has held that certain proceedings, while they 
may involve a state, do not invoke the Eleventh Amendment’s 
protections because they are merely ancillary to the main lawsuit and do 
not impact the state’s treasury. For example, in Florida Department of 
State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc.,169 a plurality of the Court held sovereign 
immunity did not bar an arrest warrant brought by a private party in 
federal district court to secure property in the possession of the State of 
Florida.170 The warrant proceeding was ancillary to an earlier suit 
brought to determine ownership of the property, and the state was not 
named as a party in that earlier suit.171 The Court determined sovereign 
immunity did not apply to bar the warrant proceeding, in part because 
the warrant “sought possession of specific property[,] . . . did not seek 
any attachment of state funds and would impose no burden on the state 
treasury.”172 One could presume the plurality did not consider the arrest 
warrant to be a “lawsuit” for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment 
because the “warrant itself merely secure[d] possession of the property; 
its execution [did] not finally adjudicate the State’s right to the 
artifacts.”173  
In an earlier case, Hutto v. Finney,174 the Court also held the 
Eleventh Amendment did not apply to a proceeding it considered 
“ancillary” to a prospective order enforcing federal law.175 In Hutto, the 
district court, after extensive factual findings, ordered officials at the 
Arkansas Department of Corrections several times to remedy 
                                                                                                                     
 166. 535 U.S. 743 (2002). 
 167. Id. at 756. 
 168. Id. at 756–60. 
 169. 458 U.S. 670 (1982). 
 170. Id. at 682. 
 171. Id. at 676. 
 172. Id. at 697–98. 
 173. Id. at 697. 
 174. 437 U.S. 678 (1978). 
 175. Id. at 691. 
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reprehensible conditions in the state prisons.176 When the court found, 
several years later, that conditions at the prisons were actually worse
than when it issued its prospective relief order, the court found bad faith 
and awarded attorneys fees against the state defendants.177 The Supreme 
Court held that “the substantive protections of the Eleventh Amendment 
do not prevent an award of attorney’s fees” where “[t]he cost of 
compliance is ‘ancillary’ to the prospective order enforcing federal 
law,” even if the award had a compensatory effect.178 
Thus, as the lower court stated in Federal Maritime Commission, if a 
proceeding “walks, talks, and squawks very much like a lawsuit”179—
i.e., if it is adversarial, if it starts with a complaint, if it involves the 
prosecution of a claim or demand against the state directly or against its 
officers in certain circumstances, and if it seeks damages from the state 
treasury—then the Eleventh Amendment applies, and the proceeding 
may not be maintained against a state or its agencies. However, if a 
proceeding or action involving a state does not meet these factors—if it 
is ancillary to an adversarial proceeding and if it does not seek 
attachment of state funds—then sovereign immunity should not 
apply.180 
IV.   TRIBAL AND FEDERAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THEIR 
PARALLELS TO STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY  
Neither the Ninth Circuit nor the Supreme Court has yet addressed 
how state sovereign immunity principles apply to discovery requests 
issued to a state, its agencies, or its officers. Perhaps for this reason, the 
courts in the Eastern District Prison Cases looked to and applied Ninth 
Circuit case law addressing tribal sovereign immunity.181 Other courts 
have drawn parallels between federal and state sovereign immunity.182 
                                                                                                                     
 176. Id. at 680. The earlier cases seeking to improve conditions at the prisons were brought 
against state officials acting in their official capacities. In this context, generally the only 
remedies available to plaintiffs involve prospective injunctive relief; damages are barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 n.5 (1989). 
 177. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 684–85. 
 178. Id. at 690, 692 (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974)); see also 
Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 278–82 (1989). 
 179. S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 243 F.3d 165, 174 (4th Cir. 2001), aff’d 
535 U.S. 743. 
 180. This distinction will prove important later in Part V.A of this Article when I argue that 
discovery requests issued to state employees or state agencies are “ancillary” to an adversarial 
proceeding and thus are not “lawsuits” and not barred by sovereign immunity. 
 181. In Estate of Gonzalez v. Hickman, the court noted, but declined to follow, an earlier 
district court case within the Ninth Circuit that held that state sovereign immunity does not 
authorize a state government to refuse to provide discovery. No. S06-0095(MCE)(GGH), 2006 
WL 3201069, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2006) (citing Laxalt v. C.K. McClatchy, 109 F.R.D. 632 
(D. Nev. 1986)). 
 182. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 n.11 (1984); 
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 (6 Wheat.) U.S. 264, 411–12 (1821); Palomar Pomerado Health Sys. v. 
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Two basic principles apply to each of the forms of sovereign immunity: 
(1) the government is immune from suit unless it waives its immunity, 
and (2) a private plaintiff may pursue an action against a government 
officer for injunctive relief. However, important distinctions among 
tribal, federal, and state sovereign immunity suggest that while cases 
addressing one type of immunity may be persuasive in cases addressing 
another, they should not have precedential weight. This Section will 
start to tease out the differences among the various forms of sovereign 
immunity and set the stage for the discussion in Part VI on the 
application of sovereign immunity principles to federal discovery.183  
A.  Tribal Sovereign Immunity 
Indian tribal forms of government existed prior to the creation of the 
United States government, and thus tribal sovereignty precedes the 
drafting of the Constitution.184 An early Supreme Court case addressing 
tribal sovereignty, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, classified tribes as 
“domestic dependent nations” whose “relation to the United States 
resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”185 However, the Court later 
clarified in Worcester v. Georgia,186 that this ward-guardian relationship 
between tribes and the United States does not strip the tribes of the right 
to self-government.187 The Court noted, “The Indian nations had always 
been considered as distinct, independent political communities, 
retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the 
soil, from time immemorial[.]”188 Once the federal government was 
created by the Constitution, Congress continued to recognize the tribes 
as independent sovereigns by passing “acts to regulate trade and 
intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations . . . [and] as 
distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within 
which their authority is exclusive.”189 
 
                                                                                                                     
Belshe, 180 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 1999); Blaylock v. Schwinden, 862 F.2d 1352, 1353–54 
(9th Cir. 1988). 
 183. Foreign sovereign immunity warrants its own set of federal statutes, se  Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–11 (2006), and is outside the scope of this 
Article. 
 184. “The present right of tribes to govern their members and territories flows from a 
preexisting sovereignty limited, but not abolished, by their inclusion within the territorial 
bounds of the United States.” COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, § 6.02[1] (Nell 
Jessup Newton ed., 2005) [hereinafter COHEN’ S HANDBOOK]. For a more in-depth review of 
tribal law, Cohen’s handbook is a good source. 
 185. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). 
 186. 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
 187. Id. at 561. 
 188. Id. at 559. 
 189. Id. at 556–57. 
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Two sections in the Constitution address Indian tribes and reinforce 
the principle that they are sovereigns separate from the states and 
federal government. The Commerce Clause lays out Congress’ 
legislative power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”190 And Article I, 
Section 2 states that “Indians not taxed” are to be excluded from the 
number of “free Persons” used for determining representative 
apportionment.191 Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law notes that 
these two sections demonstrate the “historic notion of tribal 
independence” and that the United States has always considered Indians 
“citizens of distinct sovereigns.”192 
This understanding of the historic bases for tribal sovereignty is 
important to provide context for a discussion of a subset of that 
sovereignty: tribal sovereign immunity.193 Similar to the states, tribes 
are immune from suit unless Congress has clearly abrogated that 
immunity or unless tribes waive their immunity.194 Tribes and tribal 
entities or agencies may not be sued—either for governmental or 
commercial actions, on or off tribal land—if the entity being sued is an 
“arm of the tribe.”195 However, also similar to states, tribal sovereign 
immunity does not extend to individual members of a tribe196 unless 
those members are tribal officials who are acting in their official 
capacity and within their official scope of authority.197 The Supreme 
Court has consistently held that the rule of Ex Parte Young applies to 
tribal officials just as it does to state officials, so tribal immunity does 
not preclude actions against tribal officials when they are acting outside 
the scope of their authority.198 
Courts often compare tribal sovereign immunity to state sovereign 
immunity.199 Although parallels can be drawn between the two, the 
                                                                                                                     
 190. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added). 
 191. Id. § 2, cl. 3. 
 192. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 184, § 6.03[2][a]. 
 193. See Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, P. C., 
476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986) (“The common law sovereign immunity possessed by the Tribe is a 
necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and self-governance.”). 
 194. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 757–60 (1998). 
 195. Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1046–47 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that 
when a casino is owned and operated by the tribe, it is immune from suit). 
 196. Puyallup Tribe v. Dep’t of Game of Wash., 433 U.S. 165, 171–72 (1977). 
 197. Davis v. Littell, 398 F.2d 83, 84–85 (9th Cir. 1968). 
 198. See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 
U.S. 505, 514 (1991); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978) (citing Ex Parte 
Young and holding, as an officer of the tribe, the petitioner was not protected by the tribe’s 
sovereign immunity); N. States Power Co. v. Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux Indian Cmty., 
991 F.2d 458, 460 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 199. See supra note 198. Tribal sovereign immunity has also been compared to federal and 
foreign sovereign immunity. See California v. Quechan Tribe of Indians, 595 F.2d 1153, 1155 
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legal basis for each is distinct. While tribal immunity derives from the 
tribes’ status as independent nations that pre-existed the United States 
and is based on principles derived from common law,200 state sovereign 
immunity derives from both common law and the Eleventh 
Amendment. In addition, the Supreme Court has held that, unlike state 
sovereign immunity which seems mostly impervious to abrogation, 
“[t]he sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain . . . exists only at the 
sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance.”201 
Further, the immunity possessed by Indian tribes is neither coextensive 
nor congruent with that of the states or the federal government.202 In 
Noatak v. Hoffman,203 the Ninth Circuit, in holding that state sovereign 
immunity did not apply to bar a suit brought by a tribe against the state 
of Alaska, stated that the tribes, “although not states, are like states in 
their presence within the United States as units of government.”204 
However, the Supreme Court, in overruling the Ninth Circuit on appeal, 
clearly distinguished state sovereign immunity from tribal sovereign 
immunity.205 The Court held that, while states surrendered their 
immunity against their sister states and the United States when they 
adopted the Constitution, this “constitutional compact” did not include 
any inherent surrender of immunity to the tribes because the tribes did 
not participate in the constitutional convention;206 the tribes did not 
surrender their sovereignty to the states and neither did the states to the 
tribes.  
Thus, although it may be appropriate to look to cases discussing 
tribal sovereign immunity for guidance in adjudicating state sovereign 
immunity issues, the legal and factual foundations supporting each are 
so different that tribal cases should not be controlling precedent in state 
cases. 
                                                                                                                     
(9th Cir. 1979) (noting that the “sovereign immunity of Indian tribes is similar to the sovereign 
immunity of the United States”); see also Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 759 (drawing a parallel 
between tribal sovereign immunity and the immunity of foreign sovereigns). But cf. Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 18 (1831) (holding explicitly that Indian tribes are not foreign 
states). 
 200. See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 58 (“Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing 
the common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 201. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). 
 202. Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 785–86 (1991); see also Three 
Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, P. C., 476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986) 
(“[T]he Tribe’s immunity is not congruent with that which the Federal Government, or the 
States, enjoy.”). 
 203. 896 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1990), rev’d, 501 U.S. 775 (1991). 
 204. Id. at 1163. 
 205. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 782. 
 206. Id. at 781–82. 
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B.  Federal Sovereign Immunity 
Federal sovereign immunity is similar to state and tribal sovereign 
immunity, and the Court often invokes precedents from one to 
legitimize decisions in another.207 For example, in Cohens v. Virginia, a 
state sovereign immunity case, Justice Marshall relied on federal 
precedent and noted, “[t]he universally received opinion is, that no suit 
can be commenced or prosecuted against the United States.”208  
As is true in the state and tribal sovereign immunity contexts, the 
federal government generally enjoys immunity from suit unless it has 
waived its immunity,209 but immunity does not extend to federal officers 
sued in their official capacities for injunctive relief.210 However, the 
foundations of federal sovereign immunity are different from those of 
state and tribal immunity.211 First, unlike the other two, the Constitution 
never mentions or implies federal sovereign immunity.212 Second, 
lawsuits brought in federal court against the federal government raise 
different legal issues from similar suits brought against states or tribes. 
In the former, the federal court faces separation of powers issues—how 
much authority should the judicial branch have to enact a judgment over 
either the executive or legislative branches. In contrast, state sovereign 
                                                                                                                     
 207. JACOBS, supra note 65, at 111; TRIBE, supra note 67, § 3-25, at 532. 
 208. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 (6 Wheat.) U.S. 264, 411–12 (1821). 
 209. See, e.g., FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (“Absent a waiver, sovereign 
immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.”). 
 210. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689–90 (1949); 
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 196 (1882) (holding that a landowner could bring suit for 
injunctive relief against federal officials). Also, the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 702 (2006), allows the United States to be substituted in for a defendant federal officer in a 
suit for injunctive relief brought against the officer. 
 211. Larson, 337 U.S. at 708–09 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (noting parallels between state 
and federal sovereign immunity while recognizing that the sources for each are distinct); ee 
also Joseph D. Block, Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 
59 HARV. L. REV. 1060, 1064–65 (1946) (distinguishing federal from state sovereign immunity 
and noting “[w]ith respect to suits against the Federal Government, it is wholly a judge-made 
doctrine, since there is nothing in the Constitution requiring it”). 
 212. The fact that the Constitution does not clearly mention or even imply federal 
sovereign immunity has not stopped courts from finding federal sovereign immunity inherent in 
the Constitution. Justice Frankfurter noted, in dissenting from a case which found sovereign 
immunity protected a state from suit where it had not clearly waived its immunity, that state and 
federal “immunity from suit without consent [are] embodied in the Constitution.” Kennecott 
Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm’n, 327 U.S. 573, 580 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). He 
also noted sovereign immunity “is an anachronistic survival of monarchical privilege, and runs 
counter to democratic notions of the moral responsibility of the State.” Id.; see also 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 34 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
because the Constitution does not state affirmatively that private individuals may sue the federal 
government for money damages, the government cannot be sued without its consent); United 
States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) (“It is axiomatic that the United States may not be 
sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.”). 
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immunity in federal court raises federalism issues, and interpretations of 
tribal immunity may differ depending on a tribe’s status vis-à-vis the 
federal government or vis-à-vis the states.  
Additionally, the federal government has enacted several statutes 
waiving sovereign immunity for actions in tort,213 contract,214 and for 
injunctive relief,215 and, unlike the states, the Court interprets these 
waivers broadly.216 As well, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not apply to the 
federal government,217 and Congress has not enacted a statute providing 
waiver for actions against federal officers for money damages arising 
out of constitutional violations. Instead, in 1971, the Supreme Court 
created a remedy in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics,218 though this case is controversial.219 
Thus, while principles and case law in federal sovereign immunity 
cases are similar to those involving state sovereign immunity, as with 
tribal immunity precedent, the former cases should inform but not 
control the later. 
V.  SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND FEDERAL DISCOVERY 
In this Part, I first present in more detail the State of California’s 
argument that sovereign immunity protects its employees and agencies 
from responding to discovery. I then explore several cases discussing 
the interaction of state, tribal, and federal sovereign immunity principles 
with discovery practices in federal court.  
A.  Sovereign Immunity and the Problem of “Possession, Custody, or 
Control” in Two of the Eastern District Prison Cases 
The State of California, through its agencies and employees, raised 
sovereign immunity as a defense to discovery in each of the Eastern 
                                                                                                                     
 213. See Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006). 
 214. See Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2006). 
 215. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). 
 216. See Hoffman v. Conn. Dep’t of Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96, 114 (1989) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that, unlike the narrow scope of waiver attributed to states, 
“[i]t is well settled that when the Federal Government waives its sovereign immunity, the scope 
of that waiver is construed liberally to effect its remedial purposes.” Id. 
 217. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 218. 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). 
 219. A full discussion of the controversy surrounding the Bivens decision is beyond the 
scope of this article; however, several current Supreme Court Justices believe Biv ns was 
wrongly decided because it creates a cause of action where none existed in the Constitution. 
Justices Scalia and Thomas have been particularly derisive toward the Bivens case. See Corr. 
Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Bivens is a relic of the 
heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action.”); 
Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Bivens and its progeny 
should be limited ‘to the precise circumstances that they involved.’” Id. (citing Malesko). 
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District Prison Cases.220 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favor 
broad and full discovery in civil litigation and allow discovery of 
relevant evidence even if that evidence may not be admissible at trial.221 
Parties may seek discovery from any other party to the lawsuit under 
Rules 26 and 34. Rule 26 requires certain initial disclosures,222 and Rule 
34 supplements Rule 26 by allowing a party to serve discovery requests 
on another party for “any designated documents or electronically stored 
information” or “tangible things” that are within the responding party’s 
“possession, custody or control.”223 However, sometimes nonparties 
(individuals or organizations not party to the lawsuit) have information 
relevant to a case. Taking this into consideration, Rule 45, using 
language similar to Rule 34, allows parties to obtain discovery from 
nonparties via subpoena.224 
In contesting the plaintiff’s discovery requests in two of the Eastern 
District Prison Cases, the State of California relied on a novel and 
perplexing twist to the sovereign immunity defense. When the civil 
rights plaintiffs in Allen v. Woodford225 and Thomas v. Hickman226 
served routine Rule 34 discovery requests on state employee defendants 
for copies of documents (such as hospital contracts and doctor 
complaints) that were both relevant to their cases and of the type that 
would be within the defendants’ possession,227 the defendants argued 
they had no “legal right to the documents” because the documents were 
                                                                                                                     
 220. See Allen v. Woodford, 544 F. Supp. 2d 1074 (E.D. Cal. 2008); Thomas v. Hickman, 
No. CV F 06-0215 AWI SMS, 2008 WL 782476 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2008). 
 221. FED. R. CIV . P. 26(b)(1). (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not 
privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party . . . . Relevant information need 
not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence.”). 
 222. FED. R. CIV . P. 26.  Rule 26 requires, as part of the parties’ initial disclosures, that a 
party provide all other parties with “a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all 
documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things that are in the possession, 
custody, or control of the party and that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or 
defenses.” FED. R. CIV . P. 26(a)(1)(B). 
 223. FED. R. CIV . P. 34(a). 
 224. Rule 45 states that every subpoena shall “command each person to whom it is directed 
to attend and give testimony or to produce and permit inspection, copying, testing, or sampling 
of designated books, documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things in the 
possession, custody or control of that person.” FED. R. CIV . P. 45(a)(1)(C). 
 225. 544 F. Supp. 2d 1074 (E.D. Cal. 2008). Another case, Scott v. Suryadevara, was 
joined with the Allen case for discovery purposes because it involved similar facts. See Third 
Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 24–27, 2007 WL 969232 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2007) (No. 1:05-CV-
01282-OWW-WMW-PC). 
 226. Case No. CV F 06-0215 AWI SMS, 2008 WL 782476 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2008). 
 227. See, e.g., Allen v. Woodford, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1140 (E.D. Cal. 2008); Thomas v. 
Hickman, No. 1:06-cv-00215-AWI-SMS, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95796, at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. 
Dec. 6, 2007). 
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owned by the state.228 Therefore, the defendants claimed, they had no 
responsive documents within their “possession, custody or control.”229 
The plaintiffs then tried to get documents from alternate sources by 
serving Rule 45 subpoenas on nonparty state employees such as 
custodians of records at the prisons.230 However, the nonparties also 
claimed they lacked any legal right to or control over the documents.231 
Instead, similar to the state defendants, they argued the documents were 
the property of the State of California and that compelling  the State of 
California to turn over documents violated the Eleventh Amendment.232 
Parties to litigation often fight over whether discovery is within their 
“possession, custody, or control.” Neither the Federal Rules nor their 
Advisory Committee Notes define these terms,233 but in general parties 
                                                                                                                     
 228. Thomas, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95796, at *32. 
 229. See, e.g., Joint Statement re Discovery Disputes of Plaintiff at 4, Allen v. Woodford, 
Case No. 1:05-cv-1104-LJO-NEW, 2007 WL 309945  (E.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2007). 
 230. After the defendants refused to comply with discovery requests, the court ordered 
them to identify non parties that would have responsive documents. See id. at *7. The plaintiffs 
then served subpoenas on the nonparties identified by the defendants. See Allen, 543 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1139. 
 231. See, e.g., Allen v. Woodford, Case No. 05-1104, Doc. No. 204 (“Non-Parties’ 
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel”) at 7 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 2008). The State of 
California relied on Estate of Gonzalez v. Hickman for its argument that sovereign immunity 
applied to discovery issued to individuals, although the case did not address the issue because 
the court was only presented with the question of whether a state agency must respond to a 
subpoena. See Estate of Gonzalez v. Hickman, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 1226, 1227 (E.D. Cal. 2006) 
(noting that the Gonzalez plaintiff served subpoenas directly on the CDCR itself); see also 
Gonzalez, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83702, at *3, n.5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007) (citing Allen v. 
Woodford, No. CV F-05-1104 OWW LJO, 2007 WL 309945, *3, and noting “[s]ubsequent 
magistrate judges in the Eastern District have questioned [Gonzalez’s] result, and limited the 
State’s subpoena immunity to subpoenas served directly on the State itself rather than on its 
employees.”). 
 232. See, e.g., Non-Parties’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Production of 
Documents at 7, Allen v. Woodford, No. 1:05-cv-1104-OWW-GSA, (E.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 2008). 
 233. But see BLACK ’S LAW DICTIONARY 1201 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “possession” as 
“[t]he fact of having or holding property in one’s power; the exercise of dominion over 
property. . . . The right under which one may exercise control over something to the exclusion of 
all others; the continuing exercise of a claim to the exclusive use of a material object”). S e also 
id. at 412 (defining “custody” as “[t]he care and control of a thing or person for inspection, 
preservation, or security”). Moore’s Federal Practice lists several factors to be considered in 
determining whether a party has “possession or control” over items: 
The use or purpose to which the materials were employed.  
Whether the materials were generated, acquired, or maintained with the party’s 
assets. 
Whether the party actually generated, acquired, or maintained the materials. 
Whether the party determined the materials’ use, location, possession, or 
access. 
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do not contest whether they have “possession” or “custody” over 
materials because courts have held that “records which are normally 
kept in the business of the party . . . are presumed to exist [and thus be 
in the party’s possession or custody], absent a sworn denial.”234 Some 
courts have even required employees to produce their employer’s 
records if they have the practical ability to obtain them.235 As noted, the 
documents sought by the plaintiffs in Allen and Hickman were of the 
type the defendants or nonparties could be expected to keep in their 
possession or custody. Yet, despite these requirements, the Allen and 
Hickman defendants and nonparties argued they lacked “control” over 
the documents—that they lacked the legal ability to obtain them 
because the state legally owned the documents.236  
                                                                                                                     
Who actually had access to and use of the materials. 
The extent to which the materials serve the party’s interests. 
Any formal or informal evidence of a transfer of ownership or title. 
The ability of the party to the action to obtain the documents when it wants 
them. 
Whether and to what degree the nonparty will receive the benefits of any award 
in the case. 
The nonparty’s connection to the transaction at issue. 
JAMES C. FRANCIS &  ROBERT M. BLOOM, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 34.14[2][b] (2009). 
 234. Norman v. Young, 422 F.2d 470, 473 (10th Cir. 1970) (citing cases and holding 
default judgment ordered against defendants was proper sanction where defendants willfully 
failed to produce documents as ordered by the district court). Instead, parties contest whether, if 
they do not have a document in their possession or custody, they nevertheless have “control” 
over it. However, courts are generally clear that “control” over an item includes the legal ability 
to obtain the item, even if it is no longer in the actual possession of the party. See FRANCIS &  
BLOOM, supra note 233, § 34.14[2][b] nn. 15–17 (citations omitted) (citing cases supporting 
proposition that control over an item includes the legal ability to obtain the item); WILLIAM W. 
SCHWARZER, A. WALLACE TASHIMA, &  JAMES M. WAGSTAFFE, CAL. PRAC. GUIDE FED. CIV . PRO. 
BEFORE TRIAL ch. 11(IV)-C [11:1826] (citations omitted) (same); see also Poole ex rel. Elliott v. 
Textron, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 494, 500–01, 510–11 (D. Md. 2000) (noting “[i]t is well established 
that ‘control’ under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 is to be broadly construed so that a party may be 
obligated to produce documents requested even though it may not actually possess the 
documents” and awarding sanctions where defendant failed to produce documents it gave to its 
attorney); Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr. v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 142, 160 (3d Cir. 2004); Bank of 
N.Y. v. Meridien Bio Bank Tanz., 171 F.R.D. 135, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“[D]ocuments are 
considered to be under a party’s control when that party has the right, authority, or practical 
ability to obtain the documents.”) (emphasis added). 
 235. See, e.g., In re Flag Telecom Holdings, Ltd. Secs. Litig., 236 F.R.D. 177, 181 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 236. See Order on Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Documents from the Individual 
Defendants, Allen v. Woodford, No. 05-1104, 2007 WL 309945, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2007) 
(“Defendants raise a late objection that discovery is not permitted on the CDCR Defendants in 
their individual capacities because they are not authorized by the State of California to obtain 
custody, possession or control of responsive documents.”); Thomas v. Hickman, No. CV F 06-
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Other courts have rejected similar “possession, custody or control” 
arguments, though not where the party served with discovery asserted 
sovereign immunity. For example, in Hamilton v. Kerik,237 another 
prisoner’s rights action, the court ordered defendant officers to answer 
interrogatories, rejecting their argument that any information requested 
“‘would be in the possession, custody, and control of New York 
State.’” 238 Similarly, in another prisoner suit, Kitchen v. Humphrey,239 a 
Georgia court, in sanctioning a prison warden for failing to provide 
responsive documents, noted that documents such as “personnel 
assignment information” including “duty rosters, move slips, reviews, 
payroll, personnel, and disciplinary reports” must be within the 
defendant warden’s “custody and control” because they are “essential to 
the orderly management of the prison; and are produced, utilized, and 
archived in the normal course of operations.”240 
The state employees’ arguments in the Eastern District Prison Cases, 
if accepted, could prevent all access to documents essential to proving 
civil rights cases involving the state. Generally, in civil litigation, even 
if a party turns out not to have legal “control” over a document, the 
party seeking discovery may still be able to obtain the document 
through a subpoena issued to a nonparty who does have control. Yet, in 
the Eastern District Prison Cases, where the State of California was the 
employer for both the defendants and the nonparties, the state’s novel 
sovereign immunity defense based on lack of “control” over documents 
would bar all access to responsive documents. It raised the stakes much 
higher than in civil litigation between private parties because, if the 
plaintiffs could not get documents from defendants or the nonparties, 
there was no one else left to subpoena who, based on the state’s 
argument, would not be protected by sovereign immunity. Although the 
Eastern District Prison Case plaintiffs were suing individual defendants 
                                                                                                                     
0215 AWI SMS, 2008 WL 782476, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2008). It is questionable whether 
the defendants’ and non parties’ argument based solely on the “control” part of “possession, 
custody or control” is valid because it neglects to read the statute as a whole—it fails to 
recognize that the Rule, by using the disjunctive “or” requires production in three distinct 
instances, so that even if parties lack “control” over the documents, they should be required to 
disclose them as long as they still have either “possession” or “custody.” See Bess v. Cate, No. 
2:07-cv-1989 JAM JFM, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100253, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2008) 
(“Since the requirement is in the disjunctive (‘possession, custody or control’), actual possession 
of a document is not required.” (citing In re Bankers Trust Co., 61 F.3d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 
1995))). 
 237. No. 01-CV-6934 GELHBP, 2002 WL 31834428 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2002). 
 238. Id. at *1–2. 
 239. No. 1:03-cv-008 (WLS), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15128 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2006). 
 240. Id. at *6–7. Plaintiffs in the Eastern District Prison Cases also sued prison wardens 
and served them with discovery requests for information similar to that sought in Kitchen. See 
Allen v. Woodford, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1140 (E.D. Cal. 2008); Thomas v. Hickman, No. 
1:06-cv-00215-AWI-SMS, 2007 WL 4302974, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2007). 
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who were not themselves protected from suit by sovereign immunity, 
the plaintiffs could not prove their cases if the state were able to block 
all discovery with a state sovereign immunity defense.  
B.  The State Sovereign Immunity Defense Applied to Discovery 
Requests 
There are very few published opinions on the issue of state sovereign 
immunity and federal discovery requests, whether those requests are to 
defendants under Rule 34 or to nonparties via subpoena under Rule 45. 
Most courts seem to assume, without analysis, that sovereign immunity 
does not apply in these contexts.241 Similarly, courts have concluded, 
again without much analysis, that sovereign immunity does not protect 
state custodians of records from complying with federal grand jury 
subpoenas.242 Only one published case in any of the courts of appeals 
has addressed the application of state sovereign immunity to federal 
discovery practices. In In re Missouri Department of Natural 
Resources,243 the Eighth Circuit held that the Missouri Department of 
Natural Resources must comply with subpoena requests, even after it 
was dismissed as a party from the case based on its sovereign 
immunity.244 In doing so, the court stated that “[g]overnmental units are 
subject to the same discovery rules as other persons and entities having 
contact with the federal courts. There is simply no authority for the 
position that the Eleventh Amendment shields government entities from 
                                                                                                                     
 241. See, e.g., Grine v. Coombs, 214 F.R.D. 312, 342 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (dismissing claims 
against the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection on Eleventh Amendment 
grounds but also recognizing that the “[p]laintiffs had other available means to pursue additional 
DEP documents, such as the ability to issue a subpoena duces tecum”); Jackson v. Brinker, 147 
F.R.D. 189, 193, 205 (S.D. Ind. 1993) (holding that even though the Indiana Department of 
Corrections was immune from suit, it still had to respond to subpoenas). For examples where 
other available means exist, see, for example, Arista Records LLC v. Does 1-14, No. 08-00205, 
2008 WL 5350246, *3, n.4 (W.D. Va., Dec. 22, 2008) (citing copyright cases in which 
discovery was permitted against nonparty state colleges and universities . . . despite challenges 
(though none apparently raising sovereign immunity) by the educational institution or Doe 
defendants”). 
 242. See, e.g., In re Witness Before the Special Grand Jury 2000-2, 288 F.3d 289, 295 (7th 
Cir. 2002) (“[S]tate officials, including state lawyers, likewise enjoy no immunity [under the 
Eleventh Amendment] from disclosing relevant information [subject] to a federal grand jury 
[subpoena].”); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1117 (D. Alaska 2002) 
(requiring custodians of records of the Alaska Department of Labor, Employment Security 
Division to comply with a federal grand jury subpoena); In re Grand Jury Matter, 762 F. Supp. 
333, 336 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (requiring the Florida Department of Professional Regulation to 
comply with federal grand jury subpoena seeking records of patients who filed complaints about 
a physician with Department). 
 243. 105 F.3d 434, 436 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 244. Id. at 436. 
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discovery in federal court.”245 However, this case has not been cited for 
the same proposition by any other court, even though it is more than ten 
years old, perhaps because it relies on questionable federal sovereign 
immunity precedent for its support.246 
There are no appellate-level cases within the Ninth Circuit 
addressing state sovereign immunity and federal discovery practices. 
For this reason, both the State of California and the judge who issued 
the first order in Estate of Gonzalez v. Hickman247 looked to Ninth 
Circuit cases addressing similar issues in the tribal sovereign immunity 
context.248 Although both the state and the Gonzalez court assumed that 
tribal sovereign immunity case law was relevant and binding in the state 
sovereign immunity context,249 I have presented several reasons why 
tribal sovereign immunity law should not be precedential in this area.250 
The court should have looked instead to separate circuit precedent 
addressing subpoenas issued to a federal agency and finding such 
subpoenas not barred by immunity principles, 251 but it did not explore 
this line of cases.252 The following Parts explore both federal and tribal 
immunity in the discovery context. Then Part V.A compares and 
contrasts each to state immunity, ultimately concluding that federal 
sovereign immunity case law from the Ninth and District of Columbia 
Circuits is most persuasive in this area of law. 
C.  Tribal Sovereign Immunity and Discovery 
The Ninth Circuit has held in two cases that tribal sovereign 
immunity protects tribal entities from having to respond to court 
                                                                                                                     
 245. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 246. Although the Eighth Circuit cited in its decision U ited States v. Procter & Gamble 
Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 (1958), which addressed federal sovereign immunity, Procter & Gamble  
was not really on point because it only addressed whether the federal government, when it is 
already a proper party to litigation, must comply with discovery requests. Id. at 679–84. The 
case did not address whether the government must comply with discovery if it has not 
previously availed itself of the court. See id.  
 247. No. S-06-0095 MCE GGH, 2006 WL 3201069, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2006). 
 248. Id. at *3–4 (citing United States v. James, 980 F.2d 1314, 1319–20 (9th Cir. 1992); 
Bishop Paiute Tribe v. County of Inyo, 291 F.3d 549, 558–60 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 249. Id. 
 250. See supra Part IV.A.  
 251. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 34 F.3d 774, 780 (9th Cir. 
1994).  
 252. See Estate of Gonzalez, 2006 WL 3201069, at *2 n.2. In some of the Eastern District 
Prison Cases, the State of California cited to federal sovereign immunity cases from the Second 
and Fourth Circuits. See, e.g., Non-Parties’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel 
Production of Documents at 7, 9, 10, Allen v. Woodford, No. 1:05-cv-01104-OWW-GSA, 2008 
WL 117906 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 2008); Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Non-Parties to 
Produce Documents to Subpoenas at 4, Thomas v. Hickman, Case No. 06-00215, Docket No. 92 
(E.D. Cal. May 29, 2007). 
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processes such as a subpoena or a search warrant.253 Some courts in 
other circuits have followed this reasoning, though others have declined 
to do so.254 In United States v. James,255 relied on by the court in Estate 
of Gonzalez v. Hickman, the Ninth Circuit held sovereign immunity 
protected a tribe from complying with subpoenas issued by a criminal 
defendant accused of rape on a tribal reservation to a tribal agency for 
documents relating to his accuser’s drug and alcohol problem. The court 
recognized that this was an issue of first impression—prior cases only 
addressed tribal sovereign immunity where the tribe was a party to the 
lawsuit—and yet still held that “Indian tribes’ immunity from suit 
remains intact ‘absent express and unequivocal waiver of immunity by 
the tribe or abrogation of tribal immunity by Congress.’”256 The court 
held the tribe’s immunity derived from its “status as a dependent 
domestic nation.”257 And, although the court recognized that the tribe’s 
immunity does not extend to tribal members,258 it still held without 
further analysis that the subpoena in question, issued specifically to the 
director of social services rather than the tribe or a tribal agency, was 
barred. 
In 2002, the Ninth Circuit in Bishop Paiute Tribe v. County of 
Inyo259 explicitly reaffirmed James (albeit under very different factual 
and legal contexts) and held sovereign immunity barred a county 
                                                                                                                     
 253. See Bishop Paiute Tribe v. County of Inyo, 291 F.3d 549, 557–60 (9th Cir. 2002); 
United States v. James, 980 F.2d 1314, 1319–20 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 254. See Catskill Dev., LLC v. Park Place Entm’t Corp., 206 F.R.D. 78, 86–88 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002) (finding tribal sovereign immunity protected a tribe and its agencies from subpoena but 
also finding waiver applied to some parties). But cf. Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island, 
449 F.3d 16, 29–30 (1st Cir. 2006) (refusing to follow either James or Bishop Paiute); United 
States v. Velarde, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1315–16 (D.N.M. 1999) (finding balancing test 
appropriate and determining that the sovereign interests of the United States in enforcing the 
Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, and the court’s interests in protecting defendant’s 
constitutional rights of due process and a fair trial outweighed the tribe’s sovereign interests, in 
part because responding to the subpoena did not implicate the tribe’s treasury); In re Long 
Visitor, 523 F.2d 443, 446–47 (8th Cir. 1975) (finding tribal sovereign immunity does not 
protect a tribe from responding to a grand jury subpoena because federal jurisdiction over 
crimes committed on Indian reservations “inherently includes every aspect of federal criminal 
procedure applicable to the prosecution of such crimes”). 
 255. 980 F.2d 1314, 1319–20 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 256. Id. at 1319 (quoting Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Blackfeet Tribe, 924 F.2d 899, 901 (9th 
Cir. 1991)). 
 257. Id. (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978)). 
 258. Id. 
 259. 291 F.3d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated on other grounds by Inyo County v. 
Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Cmty. of the Bishop Colony, 538 U.S. 701 (2003). 
James addressed whether a subpoena issued in a federal criminal case to a tribal agency violated 
the tribe’s sovereign immunity. See James, 980 F.2d at 1319–20. Bishop was also brought in 
federal court, but it was a civil rights action, not a criminal case. Se  Bishop, 291 F.2d at 554. In 
Bishop, the court addressed whether the tribe’s sovereign immunity barred a county sheriff and 
district attorney from executing a search warrant on the tribe for tribal documents. Id.  
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sheriff’s execution of a search warrant to seize tribal employee records 
as part of a welfare fraud investigation. The county sheriff and district 
attorney defendants argued the warrant did not “offend the tribe’s status 
as a sovereign entity because it constituted only a ‘customary 
inconvenience’ that would accompany the service on any business,” but 
the court cited to James to reiterate that the Indian tribe’s status as 
sovereign distinguished it from other businesses.260 The court held 
conclusively, “[a]bsent a waiver of sovereign immunity, tribes are 
immune from processes of the court.”261 
Although the court decided the case in the context of tribal sovereign 
immunity law and tribal law in general, the court also compared the 
tribe’s interest in protecting its records from outsiders to those of the 
State of California or the federal government and relied in part on case 
law holding the United States was immune from subpoenas issued by a 
state court.262 
Yet in both Bishop Pauite and James, the court held the defendants 
had other means to obtain the information they sought. The Ninth 
Circuit held that although that sovereign immunity barred the warrant or 
subpoena at issue, the parties seeking evidence could still obtain at least 
some of the information through alternate means263 or through 
waiver.264 This is an important theme running through tribal and federal 
cases. In each of the cases finding sovereign immunity barred 
discovery, the party seeking discovery had another way to obtain at 
least some of the information. As discussed further in Part V.A, this 
would not be true if the court adopted the State of California’s 
“possession, custody, or control” theories in the Eastern District Prison 
Cases. 
As noted, several other courts outside the Ninth Circuit have 
declined to follow James and Bishop Paiute, finding that other interests 
outweighed the tribe’s sovereignty interest.265 Even courts within the 
                                                                                                                     
 260. Id. at 557–58. 
 261. Id. at 557. 
 262. Id. at 560 n.3 (citing Elko County Grand Jury v. Siminoe, 109 F.3d 554, 556 (9th Cir. 
1997) (denying enforcement of a state court subpoena to a federal employee)). 
 263. In Bishop Paiute, the court held the county officials could have issued a search 
warrant against individual tribal members rather than the tribe itself through the state’s authority 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (2006), which provides states with criminal jurisdiction over tribal 
members and crimes committed on reservations within the states’ borders. 291 F.3d at 560–61. 
 264. In James, the court upheld subpoenas for all relevant documents held by another tribal 
agency, finding that agency waived its immunity when it provided some documents voluntarily 
to the prosecution. See James, 980 F.2d at 1320. The court held the tribe “cannot selectively 
provide documents and then hide behind a claim of sovereign immunity when the defense 
requests different documents from the same agency.” Id. However, this waiver did not cross the 
line to other tribal agencies that had not provided documents to the government. Id. 
 265. See United States v. Velarde, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1316 (D.N.M. 1999). 
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Ninth Circuit have found reasons why James should not be controlling. 
For example, in United States v. Snowden,266 the court denied a tribe’s 
motion to quash a subpoena for a victim’s counseling records because it 
found the defendant’s “constitutional rights of due process, fair trial, 
confrontation, and compulsory process outweigh[ed] the [tribe’s] claim 
of immunity.”267 The court stated that “James does not control because 
the defendant [in James] did not raise constitutional challenges to the 
claim of immunity.”268 Similarly, in United States v. Juvenile Male 1,269 
the court declined to follow James because James did not address 
constitutional challenges to the tribe’s assertion of sovereign immunity 
such as the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right “to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him; [and] to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor.”270 
James and Bishop may also be questionable precedent, given dicta in 
a 1986 Supreme Court case, Three Affiliated Tribes of Ft. Berthold 
Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P. C.271 In that case the Court, in 
holding that a state statute requiring a tribe to waive its sovereign 
immunity was preempted by federal Indian law, suggested that certain 
court processes, though they may affect tribal government, are not 
barred by sovereign immunity.272 The Court stated,  
not all conditions imposed [by a state] on access to state 
courts which potentially affect tribal immunity, and thus 
tribal self-government, are objectionable. For instance, 
even petitioner [tribe] concedes that its tribal immunity 
does not extend to protection from the normal processes of 
the state court in which it has filed suit.273  
The Court also noted that the tribe admitted it was subject to 
“discovery proceedings and to proceedings that would insure a fair trial 
to the non-Indian defendants.”274 Although the Court discussed 
discovery in the context of tribes as parties to litigation who have 
already availed themselves of the court, rather than as nonparties,275 hi  
                                                                                                                     
 266. 879 F. Supp. 1054 (D. Or. 1995). 
 267. Id. at 1057. 
 268. Id. 
 269. 431 F. Supp. 2d 1012 (D. Ariz. 2006). 
 270. Id. at 1017–18 (internal citations omitted). The court also noted the incongruous effect 
its ruling would have on the Navajo tribe if it were to follow James. Id. at 1018. The tribe’s 
borders overlap both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, and a district court within the Tenth Circuit 
expressly declined to follow James. See Velarde, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 1315–16.  
 271. 476 U.S. 877 (1986). 
 272. Id. at 884. 
 273. Id. at 891. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id.  
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dicta suggests discovery is something less than a lawsuit and that other 
interests, such as a fair trial, should be balanced against the tribe’s 
sovereign interests in this context. 
D.  Federal Sovereign Immunity and Discovery 
As discussed previously, federal sovereign immunity in federal court 
is based on different principles from state sovereign immunity in the 
same venue. When a state invokes a sovereign immunity defense in 
federal court, it raises federalism issues. However, when the federal 
government invokes a sovereign immunity defense in the same court, it 
raises separation of powers issues. Nevertheless, because courts often 
invoke precedent from one to legitimize decisions in the other,276 and 
because several courts have addressed the intersection of federal 
immunity and discovery, federal sovereign immunity warrants 
discussion. 
Appellate courts have addressed federal sovereign immunity in the 
discovery context to mixed results. The District of Columbia and Ninth 
Circuits have both held that the federal government is not immune from 
subpoenas, while the Second and Fourth Circuits have disagreed. 
The D.C. Circuit, the first appellate court to face the issue, did so in 
three important cases. First, in Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas 
Corp., the court noted that since at least 1965, it had “assumed the 
nonapplicability of sovereign immunity” to a subpoena directed at the 
government and stated, “we find no cause in the present case to upset a 
steady course of precedent by attempting to graft onto discovery law a 
broad doctrine of sovereign immunity.”277 Next, in Linder v. Calero-
Portocarrero,278 a later case in which parents of an aid worker slain by 
contra soldiers in Nicaragua sought documents from various federal 
agencies, the court held nonparty subpoenas do not trigger sovereign 
immunity because subpoenas do not seek damages and because the 
federal government waived its immunity in the Administrative 
Procedure Act for actions “seeking relief other than money 
damages.”279 
                                                                                                                     
 276. See supra Part IV.B. 
 277. 751 F.2d 395, 398 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In Northrop, the court raised the issue of 
sovereign immunity sua sponte, after McDonnell Douglas issued discovery subpoenas to the 
Defense and State Departments, and requested supplemental briefing on the issue from the 
parties. In declining to find federal sovereign immunity barred the subpoenas at issue, it noted 
that, “[a]s far as the briefs and our independent research disclose, the issue has never been 
explicitly discussed in the opinion of any federal court.” Id  (emphasis added). 
 278. 251 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 279. Id. at 181 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006)). The Administrative Procedure Act states that 
federal courts may review claims against the federal government that seek “relief other than 
money damages” and that state “a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted 
or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority.” 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). It 
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Finally, in Yousuf v. Samantar,280 the court held the State 
Department was not immune from subpoenas issued by Somali 
nationals in their suit brought under the Torture Victim Protection 
Act.281 The D.C. Circuit recognized that the federal government is not 
“exempt from the obligation of a nonparty to provide its evidence 
pursuant to subpoena” because “the Government is a ‘person’ subject to 
subpoena under Rule 45.”282 The State Department had argued it was 
not a “person” subject to Rule 45,283 but the court noted that there were 
only two situations at common law in which the government “was 
presumed not to be a ‘person’ bound by statute,” and Rule 45 fell into 
neither category.284 First, the government did not have an “established 
prerogative” not to respond to subpoenas; in fact, the court noted, the 
government, in briefing a 1900 Supreme Court case, admitted “that 
records requested for a suit in which it was not a party ‘could be secured 
by a subpoena duces tecum to the head of the Treasury Department.’”285 
Second, applying Rule 45 to the government would not “work an 
obvious absurdity” (as, for example, applying a speeding law to a 
policeman pursuing a criminal) because the discovery rules were 
intended “to provide a ‘liberal opportunity for discovery,’”286 and 
because other Rules of Civil Procedure have been interpreted as 
applying to the government.287 Therefore, to find Rule 45 did not apply 
would be inconsistent and “would attribute a schizophrenic intent to the 
drafters” of the Federal Rules.288  
The Ninth Circuit has also refused to find that sovereign immunity 
protects federal agencies from responding to subpoenas, though on 
slightly different grounds. In Exxon Shipping Co. v. United States 
Department of Interior,289 a case arising out of the Valdez oil spill in 
                                                                                                                     
also states that it does not affect “limitations on judicial review or the power or duty of the court 
to dismiss any action or deny relief on any other appropriate legal or equitable ground.” Id.  
 280. 451 F.3d 248 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 281. Id. at 250 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)). 
 282. 451 F.3d at 254, 257 (holding “the term ‘person’ as used in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure consistently means not only natural persons and business associations but also 
governments, including the United States”). The court in Linder v. Calero-Portocarrero raised 
but left open the question of whether the government is a “person” pursuant to Rule 45. 251 
F.3d at 181–82. 
 283. Yousuf, 451 F.3d at 253 (arguing “statutes employing the [word ‘person’] are 
ordinarily construed to exclude” the sovereign) (citing United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 
600, 604 (1941)).  
 284. Id. at 254 (citing Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 283–84 (1937)). 
 285. Id. (quoting United States ex. rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462, 471–72 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 286. Id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 
 287. Id. at 256 (citations omitted). 
 288. Id. (citing Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 21 (1985)). 
 289. 34 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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which Exxon sought discovery from the Interior Department, the court 
cited Northrop v. McDonnell Douglas, and concluded that applying 
sovereign immunity principles in discovery would result in the 
abdication of ‘“judicial control over the evidence in a case . . . to the 
caprice of executive officers.’”290 The court also recognized the public’s 
right ‘“to every man’s evidence’” would be violated if the executive 
branch were able to refuse to comply with subpoenas.291 And while the 
court acknowledged the government’s legitimate interest in not having 
to expend its limited employee resources on responding to discovery 
requests, the court noted that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
various privilege rules provided sufficient limitations on discovery to 
prevent an unnecessary expense of government resources.292 
The Ninth Circuit and District of Columbia Circuit’s approaches to 
sovereign immunity and discovery are in line with early commentators 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure such as Edson R. Sunderland, 
who noted in 1939 that “[n]o distinction is made in the federal 
discovery and deposition rules between private parties and the officers 
and agencies of government.”293 Similarly, Raoul Berger and Abe Krash 
stated in 1950:  
It has long been considered that all persons have a duty to 
produce relevant evidence, upon the assumption that the 
interest of the public in seeing that justice is done out-
weighs the right to privacy. The Rules have merely 
underscored that duty. . . . [T]he terms of the third party 
subpoena-deposition provisions are unqualified, and no 
considerations of policy can afford an exemption to the 
Government, though they might have some bearing upon 
the measure of the asserted privilege.294 
However, other circuits have followed a different course. The 
Second Circuit, instead of assuming the non-applicability of sovereign 
immunity to discovery as the District of Columbia Circuit did in 
Northrop, has held consistently that sovereign immunity does apply to 
subpoenas issued to government agencies.295 Specifically, the court has 
                                                                                                                     
 290. Id. (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1953)). 
 291. Id. (quoting  United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)). 
 292. Id. at 779–80 (citing FED. R. CIV . P. 26, 45; FED. R. EVID . 501). 
 293. Edson R. Sunderland, Discovery Before Trial Under the New Federal Rules, 15 TENN. 
L. REV. 737, 742 (1939). 
 294. Raoul Berger & Abe Krash, Government Immunity From Discovery, 59 YALE L.J. 
1451, 1465–66 (1950). 
 295. See EPA v. Gen. Elec., Co., 197 F.3d 592, 598–99 (2d Cir. 1999) (expressly rejecting 
the Ninth Circuit’s analysis and approach in Exxon Shipping Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 34 
F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 1994)); see also SEC ex rel. Glotzer v. Martha Stewart, Living Omnimedia, 
Inc., 374 F.3d 184, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Absent a waiver of sovereign immunity, a federal 
agency, as representative of the sovereign, cannot be ‘compelled . . . to act.’” (quoting Gen. 
Elec., 197 F.3d at 597)). 
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held subpoenas are “judicial proceedings” against the government and 
therefore barred by sovereign immunity (absent waiver), because the 
result of a subpoena “could serve ‘to restrain the Government from 
acting, or to compel it to act.’”296 However, the court also held the 
federal government expressly waived its immunity to a limited extent 
through the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because the Act 
“specifically allows final agency actions to be reviewed by federal 
courts” in certain circumstances.297 Therefore, a government’s refusal to 
respond to a subpoena, once that refusal can be considered a “final 
agency action,” is reviewable in federal court through a motion to 
compel. 
The Fourth Circuit has taken a similar approach to the Second 
Circuit and held sovereign immunity applies to subpoenas issued to the 
federal government.298 And, similar to the Second Circuit, the Fourth 
Circuit has explicitly rejected the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Exxon but 
has still held that the federal government waives its immunity to 
subpoenas through the APA.299 Therefore, in both the Second and 
Fourth Circuits, the parties were still able, pursuant to procedures in the 
Administrative Procedures Act, to petition the court for review of the 
agency’s refusal to comply with the subpoena.300 
Thus, although the circuits are divided on whether federal sovereign 
immunity applies to subpoenas in the first instance, all that have 
reached the issue have agreed that sovereign immunity does not fully 
bar a federal court from enforcing a subpoena to the federal 
government. However, as discussed below, the distinction among the 
                                                                                                                     
 296. Gen. Elec., 197 F.3d at 597 (quoting Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963)).  
 297. Id. at 598. For example, the court may review a “final agency action” if there is a 
claim ‘“that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official 
capacity or under color of legal authority,’ and the relief sought is other than money damages.” 
Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006)). There is some question after GE about what standard of 
review a court should apply to the government’s refusal to respond to a subpoena. Se  EPA v. 
Gen. Elec., Co., 212 F.3d 689, 690 (2d Cir. 2000); SEC ex rel. Glotzer, 374 F.3d at 191. 
 298. See Boron Oil Co. v. Downie, 873 F.2d 67, 71 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding “subpoena 
proceedings fall within the protection of sovereign immunity even though they are technically 
against the federal employee and not against the sovereign”). 
 299. COMSAT Corp. v. Nat’l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d 269, 277 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that 
APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard of review applies). 
 300. See, e.g., id.; Gen. Elec. Co., 197 F.3d at 599. The Second Circuit held that although 
sovereign immunity applied to subpoenas issued to federal agencies, the federal government 
waived its immunity through the Administrative Procedures Act which provides for federal 
court review of agency actions. Id. Therefore, a party may seek review of an agency’s refusal to 
respond to a subpoena through a motion to enforce the subpoena. Id. The court noted this 
approach “will maintain the appropriate balance between the interests of the government in 
conserving limited resources, maintaining necessary confidentiality and preventing interference 
with government functions, and the interests of suitors in discovering important information 
relevant to the prosecution or defense of private litigation.” Id. 
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cases is important in making parallels to subpoenas issued in federal 
court to state governments.  
VI.   APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE TRIBAL AND FEDERAL 
IMMUNITY CASES AND THE THREE RATIONALES TO THE PROBLEM OF 
STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND FEDERAL DISCOVERY 
A.  Federal Sovereign Immunity Case Law from the Ninth and District 
of Columbia Circuits Is Most Persuasive in the State Sovereign 
Immunity Context 
The State of California, through the defendants and subpoenaed 
nonparties in Gonzalez v. Hickman and the Eastern District Prison 
Cases, has asserted that the Ninth Circuit tribal law cases and Fourth 
and Second Circuit federal sovereign immunity cases discussed above 
require a finding that sovereign immunity bars discovery served on all 
state employees and agencies.301 The Estate of Gonzalez v. Hickman 
court found the tribal law cases precedential.302 However, all of these 
cases are factually and legally distinct from the Eastern District Prison 
Cases in ways that make them poor precedent. In this Part, I argue that 
courts faced with a state sovereign immunity defense to discovery 
should look to the federal sovereign immunity cases from the Ninth and 
District of Columbia Circuits. 
The tribal cases are distinguishable for several reasons. First, and 
most obvious, both United States v. James and Bishop Pauite addressed 
tribal sovereignty, so it is questionable how reliable these cases are for 
deciding a state sovereign immunity issue.303 The court in one of the 
Eastern District Prison Cases recognized the importance of this 
distinction.304 Second, the cases stand on very different procedural 
footing—James was a criminal case, and Bishop Pauite involved a 
county-issued search warrant—so the Ninth Circuit had no opportunity 
to interpret the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in either case. Third, 
and perhaps most important, in both James and Bishop Pauite, the 
parties seeking discovery had some other means to obtain it. In James, 
the Ninth Circuit held the tribe waived its immunity over documents it 
showed to one party but not the other,305 and in Bishop Paiute, county 
officials could have obtained the documents through their Public Law 
                                                                                                                     
 301. See, e.g., Non-Parties’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Production of 
Documents, Allen v. Woodford, No. 05-01104, 2008 WL 117906 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 2008); 
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Non-Parties to Produce Documents Pursuant to 
Subpoenas, Thomas v. Hickman, Case No. 06-00215, Docket No. 92 (E.D. Cal. May 29, 2007). 
 302. See 466 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1228–29 (E.D. Cal. 2006). 
 303. See supra Part IV.A. 
 304. See Allen v. Woodford, 544 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1079–80 (E.D. Cal. 2008). 
 305. United States v. James, 980 F.2d 1314, 1319 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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280 authority over individual tribal members (rather than through the 
tribe).306 The State of California took a very different approach in the 
Eastern District Prison Cases, arguing that sovereign immunity blocks 
all discovery—party and nonparty. This would prevent plaintiffs from 
obtaining documents from any person or agency affiliated with the state 
and would result in a very different outcome from the one contemplated 
by the Ninth Circuit in the tribal cases. For these reasons, the tribal 
cases do not appear to map well to the factual and legal issues in the 
Eastern District Prison Cases.  
The federal sovereign immunity cases from the Fourth and Second 
Circuits are distinguishable from the Eastern District Prison Cases for 
one of the same reasons as the tribal cases—fairness. Although the 
courts held sovereign immunity applied to subpoenas, they also held the 
government waived its immunity under the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA). Therefore courts could review the government’s denial of 
access to discovery under administrative principles of review and 
perhaps find that denial arbitrary and capricious.307 In other words, the 
parties seeking discovery were not completely foreclosed from 
obtaining it. 
However, the Second and Fourth Circuit’s reasoning would not 
translate to the state sovereign immunity context because the APA does 
not apply to states, and state immunity waivers rarely apply in federal 
court. The State of California has relied on the Second and Fourth 
Circuit cases to argue that state sovereign immunity applies to bar all 
discovery and has argued that the state never waives its immunity.308 
But principles of fairness and the importance of litigant access to 
information counsel against adopting this approach. The federal 
sovereign immunity cases from the Ninth Circuit and District of 
Columbia Circuit do not present these problems. In Exxon Shipping Co. 
v. United States Department of Interior,309 the court stated, “The 
government’s argument [that sovereign immunity barred subpoenas] 
would [] violate the fundamental principle that ‘the public . . . has a 
right to every man’s evidence’” and would be contrary to the Federal 
                                                                                                                     
 306. Bishop Paiute Tribe v. County of Inyo, 291 F.3d 549, 560 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 307. District courts within the Second and Fourth Circuits have both found the cases 
addressing federal sovereign immunity inapplicable to the question of whether state sovereign 
immunity protects a state agency or official from responding to discovery. S e, e.g., Arista 
Records LLC v. Does 1-14, No. 08-00205, 2008 WL 5350246, *5 (W.D. Va., Dec. 22, 2008); 
Jackson v. AFSCME Local 196, No. 07-0471, 2008 WL 1848900 (D. Conn. Apr. 25, 2008). 
 308. See, e.g., Non-Parties’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Production of 
Documents, Allen v. Woodford, No. 05-01104, 2008 WL 117906, (E.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 2008); 
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Non-Parties to Produce Documents Pursuant to 
Subpoenas at 4, Thomas v. Hickman, Case No. 06-00215, Docket No. 92 (E.D. Cal. May 29, 
2007). 
 309. 34 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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Rules of Civil Procedure favoring full discovery.310 The court held 
district courts should apply standard balancing tests under the Federal 
Rules, including determining how burdensome the discovery requests 
are and whether any evidentiary privileges apply.311 There is no reason 
these same balancing tests would not work in the context of federal 
subpoenas issued to state agencies or employees.  
The analysis from the District of Columbia cases (to which the Ninth 
Circuit cited with approval in Exxon312) also appears to be closely 
analogous for several reasons. First, as in Yousuf v. Ali Samantar, 
federal court discovery issued to a state employee or agency should not 
trigger sovereign immunity because the state is no less a “person” 
subject to subpoena under Rule 45 than the federal government.313 
Second, as in Linder v. Calero-Portocarrero, sovereign immunity 
should not apply because the subpoenas do not, on their own, impose 
damages against the state.314 
Finally, neither Exxon nor the District of Columbia Circuit cases 
treated a subpoena in the first instance as a “lawsuit.”315 This is 
consistent with my analysis above that sovereign immunity applies to 
lawsuits but not to court processes ancillary to the main suit.316 A 
subpoena, which is not presumptively adversarial, which does not begin 
with a complaint, and which does not seek attachment of state funds, 
should not by its nature invoke the protections of sovereign immunity. 
A subpoena does not “walk[], talk[], [or] squawk[] very much like a 
                                                                                                                     
 310. Id. at 779 (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)). 
 311. Id. at 780. 
 312. Id. at 778 (citing  Northrop Corp.  v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395, 398 
n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
 313. See Yousuf v. Samantar, 451 F.3d 248, 253–57 (D.C. Cir. 2006). In interpreting 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, the Supreme Court has held that states and state officials acting in their official 
capacities are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State 
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65–66 (1989). However, Yousuf distinguished Will and other cases by 
analyzing the term “person” in the context of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and noting 
the federal rules clearly do include the sovereign within the meaning of the term “person.” 
Yousuf, 451 F.3d at 254–57. Although all the Eastern District Prison Cases were brought under 
§ 1983, it is more appropriate to interpret “person” as Yousuf did, under the main statute at 
issue—Rule 45—rather than under § 1983. 
 314. See Linder v. Calero-Portocarrero, 251 F.3d 178, 182–83 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The 
subpoenas in the Eastern District Prison Cases merely sought documents and things. See, e.g.,
Allen v. Woodford, 544 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1075 (E.D. Cal. 2008). Although the plaintiffs sought 
damages from the defendants in the underlying lawsuits, the defendants who would be 
responsible for those damages were state employees acting in their individual capacities, rather 
than the state itself. See, e.g., id. at 1075–76.  
 315. Although none of the cases state this explicitly, the D.C. Circuit in L nder v. Calero–
Portocarrero, 251 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2001), came close by holding that immunity does not 
apply to a subpoena because a subpoena does not involve damages, which are the most common 
remedies in a lawsuit. 
 316. See supra Part III.D.2. 
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lawsuit”317 and therefore sovereign immunity should not apply to it. 
As noted by the Ninth Circuit in Exxon, to allow immunity to apply 
in the discovery context would result in the abdication of ‘“judicial 
control over the evidence in a case . . . to the caprice of executive 
officers.”’318 This is no less important in subpoenas issued to capricious 
state executive officers than it is in subpoenas issued to federal officers. 
For each of the reasons discussed above, the Ninth and District of 
Columbia Circuit cases are the most persuasive and should apply in the 
state sovereign immunity context. 
B.  Two of the Three Rationales for State Sovereign Immunity 
Suggest it Does Not Apply to Subpoenas 
A finding that state sovereign immunity does not apply in the 
discovery context would be consistent with two of the three rationales 
for the broad reach of state sovereign immunity noted above.319 Under 
the originalist rationale, there is nothing to indicate that the framers 
planned to include subpoenas within the framework of sovereign 
immunity when they drafted the Eleventh Amendment, despite the fact 
that subpoenas were often used at the time.320 As noted in Part III.D.2, 
the language of the Eleventh Amendment and subsequent case law 
seems to make clear that sovereign immunity applies to lawsuits and 
adversarial proceedings, but not necessarily to the ancillary processes of 
a court such as a subpoena.321 The District of Columbia Circuit Court of 
Appeals noted, after conducting its own independent research in a 1984 
case, “the issue [of sovereign immunity applying to subpoenas] has 
never been explicitly discussed in the opinion of any federal court,” but 
courts “assume[] the nonapplicability of sovereign immunity” to a 
subpoena directed at the government.322 The federal government itself 
admitted, in briefing a 1900 Supreme Court case, “that records 
                                                                                                                     
 317. S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 243 F.3d 165, 174 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 318. Exxon, 34 F.3d at 778 (citing United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1953)).  
 319. See supra Part III.C. 
 320. See supra Part III.A (discussing Chisholm case, which involved a lawsuit brought 
against a state, and not a subpoena, as basis for text of Eleventh Amendment). Several early 
Supreme Court cases explicitly mention subpoenas issued to states.See, e.g., Rhode Island v. 
Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (1 Pet.) 657, 659 (1838) (issuing subpoena to State of Massachusetts); 
New Jersey v. New York, 30 U.S. (1 Pet.) 284, 290 (1831) (issuing subpoena to State of New 
York); Huger v. South Carolina, 3 U.S. (1 Dall.) 339, 339 (1797) (issuing subpoena to State of 
South Carolina).  
 321. See supra Part III.D.2. While a subpoena may constitute an inconvenience, it is 
merely a request for documents and information; it is not presumptively “adversarial” or 
adversarial in the first instance. It does not become adversarial until the subpoenaed party 
refuses to comply and the party issuing the subpoena is forced to file a motion to compel 
compliance. 
 322. Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395, 398 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  
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requested for a suit in which it was not a party ‘could be secured by a 
subpoena duces tecum to the head of the Treasury Department.’”323 
Because there is no evidence that the drafters of the Eleventh 
Amendment or the framers of the Constitution believed state (or 
federal) sovereign immunity encompassed discovery subpoenas, under 
an originalist rationale a state and its employees should not be able to 
refuse to respond to a subpoena on sovereign immunity grounds. 
Finding sovereign immunity does not apply to subpoenas issued to 
state agencies and state employees also satisfies the pragmatic rationale 
for the doctrine. As I define the pragmatic rationale, it includes the 
practical reasons the Court has provided for extending Eleventh 
Amendment state sovereign immunity beyond the bounds of the text of 
the amendment. For example, the Court often observes sovereign 
immunity must be interpreted broadly to curb the impact a flood of 
potential litigation would have on the state’s treasury and to prevent an 
“unwarranted strain on the States’ ability to govern in accordance with 
the will of their citizens.”324 However, finding sovereign immunity does 
not apply to subpoenas would not result in a flood of potential litigation 
(because it would not change a plaintiff’s inability to file a lawsuit 
against the state). It also would not overly impact the state’s treasury or 
result in excessive discovery because, as noted by the Ninth Circuit in 
Exxon, the Rules of Civil Procedure allow district courts to quash or 
modify subpoenas that would cause an “undue burden.”325 In addition, 
the government could still rely on a full panoply of privilege rules to 
contest the subpoenas.326 Finally, it would not overly impact the state’s 
treasury, first because any cost to the state in responding to the 
subpoena is ancillary to any potential judgment in the case and can be 
addressed through the processes listed in Rule 45(c),327 and second, 
because where the state itself is not a defendant to a lawsuit, any 
recovery to a civil rights plaintiff in the case will come from the state 
actor sued, not from the state.328 
                                                                                                                     
 323. Yousuf v. Samantar, 451 F.3d 248, 254 (D.C. Cir 2006) (citing United States ex r l. 
Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462, 471–72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 324. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 750–51 (1999). 
 325. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 34 F.3d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(citing FED. R. CIV . P. 26(c), 45(c)(3)). 
 326. Id. at 780 (citing to cases on state secrets and qualified executive privilege).  
 327. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974) (noting that a remedy that has an
“ancillary effect on the state treasury is . . . permissible and often an inevitable consequence of 
the principle announced in Ex parte Young”). 
 328. States may, through statute, indemnify their employees. See, e.g., CAL. GOV. CODE 
§ 825 (West 2009). Although this then means the funds to satisfy any judgment technically 
would come from the state rather than the individual defendant, it does not change the basic 
principles underlying the case nor bestow immunity on the employee defendant. See, e.g., 
Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[I]t would be absurd if all a state 
52
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The pragmatic rationale would also support creating an appropriate 
balance between state government and private parties’ rights under § 
1983 case precedent and would harmonize the purpose of § 1983 with 
that of the federal discovery rules. Section 1983 was intended “to give a 
remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and 
immunities by an official’s abuse of his position”329 by creating a 
federal private right of action against a state actor.330 A main goal of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to promote broad and full discovery 
in civil litigation. Finding that sovereign immunity does not apply to 
subpoenas would support both these purposes and the rights of a § 1983 
plaintiff because it would allow the plaintiff to obtain a remedy for 
constitutional violations by using the federal discovery rules to fully 
litigate her case against the state actor who she alleges deprived her of 
her constitutional rights. It would not impact the state’s rights in any 
way contrary to § 1983 because it would not allow her to sue the state 
directly. In contrast, finding sovereign immunity does apply to 
subpoenas would undermine the purpose of both § 1983 and Rule 45 
and the rights of the § 1983 plaintiff—if the state can refuse, on 
sovereign immunity grounds, to produce documents necessary for the 
§ 1983 plaintiff to prove her case against a state actor, it would prevent 
the plaintiff from fully litigating her case and, by extension, obtaining a 
remedy for constitutional violations. Thus, the pragmatic rationale 
supports not applying sovereign immunity to subpoenas. 
As noted above, in the past two decades, the Supreme Court has 
increasingly relied on a “dignity” rationale to support extending state 
sovereign immunity to contexts outside the text of the Eleventh 
Amendment, holding in Federal Maritime Commission v. South 
Carolina State Ports Authority,331 “[T]he preeminent purpose of state 
sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is consistent with 
their status as sovereign entities.”332 The dignity rationale, if taken to its 
extreme, has the potential to undermine any action even tangentially 
involving the state.333 It is, therefore, the biggest threat to an argument 
                                                                                                                     
had to do to put its employees beyond the reach of section 1983 . . . was to promise to 
indemnify.”); Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1147 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting Ronwin v. 
Shapiro, 657 F.2d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting “the incongruity that would result if a 
state, ‘by creating a fund to compensate victims, has somehow extended immunity [to state 
employees] so as to deny payment to the class of intended beneficiaries’”)).  
 329. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961).  
 330. Id. at 173. 
 331. 535 U.S. 743 (2002). 
 332. Id. at 760.  
 333. The dignity rationale could easily become limitless because, unlike the other two 
rationales, it does not involve a test or distinction the courts could apply or advance a principle. 
Instead it uses circular reasoning to reinforce itself—because the states are powerful, they 
possess a certain “dignity” that makes them untouchable through the courts or the federal 
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against extending sovereign immunity to subpoenas, and it is far from 
clear that the Supreme Court would not rely on this rationale to bar 
subpoenas in § 1983 actions. However, as noted above, one of the 
earliest sovereign immunity cases clearly rejected this argument. In 
Cohens v. Virginia,334 the Court noted, “We must ascribe the [Eleventh] 
amendment, then, to some other cause than the dignity of a State.”335 
Many scholars have also taken issue with this rationale, noting as early 
as 1946, “the indignity of subjecting a government to judicial process at 
the instance of private parties seems to be an objection lacking in force, 
however substantial a consideration it might have been in the times 
when state and federal governments were less solidly established than 
they are now.”336 
These counterarguments to the “dignity” rationale—combined with 
the reasoning underlying the originalist and pragmatic rationales, the 
Ninth and District of Columbia Circuit’s federal sovereign immunity 
cases, and the case law supporting the argument that state sovereign 
immunity does not apply to ancillary court processes such as 
subpoenas—should outweigh the weight of recent Supreme Court 
“dignity” precedent. 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
The State of California, by arguing in the Eastern District Prison 
Cases that state employee defendants and subpoenaed nonparty state 
employees lack authority to produce documents and that sovereign 
immunity protects the state and its agencies from subpoenas, seems 
intent on hobbling civil rights cases before they begin. The state’s 
position—that, in essence, no discovery can be had in § 1983 actions 
brought against state employees—conflicts with the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which apply to all civil actions in federal court. Rule 
26 states that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any 
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense”337 
and that no rule limits the Federal Rules to non-state actors. More 
                                                                                                                     
government. While states can still choose to limit their power voluntarily (for example through 
waiver) the more untouchable they are, the more powerful they become, and the less incentive 
they have to limit themselves. 
 334. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). 
 335. Id. at 406. 
 336. See Joseph J. Block, Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity 
Doctrine, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1060, 1060–61 (1946). Justice Stevens has consistently dissented to 
opinions based on the dignity rationale, noting it “is an ‘embarrassingly insufficient’ rationale 
for the rule [of extending Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity].” Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. 
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 97 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer 
Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 151 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting)); see also Fed. 
Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 770 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 337. FED. R. CIV . P. 26(b)(1). 
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importantly, however, the state’s position, if followed by other courts in 
the future, could prevent the prosecution of important § 1983 civil rights 
actions against state defendants. Without discovery, plaintiffs would not 
be able to prove the facts alleged in their cases if they brought their 
actions in federal court. And, while civil rights plaintiffs could try to 
pursue federal civil rights claims in state court,338 this would create an 
anomalous situation where such plaintiffs are barred from pursuing 
federal claims under the Constitution in federal court.  
The weight of case law interpreting state and federal sovereign 
immunity and the main rationales behind a broad application of state 
sovereign immunity do not support California’s novel sovereign 
immunity arguments, and these arguments should not outweigh the 
important constitutional interests at issue in federal civil rights cases. As 
Peter Low and John Jeffries have noted, “[t]he stakes involved in 
interpreting the 11th [A]mendment are potentially very high. Virtually 
the entire class of modern civil rights litigation [plausibly] might be 
barred by an expansive reading of the immunity of states from suit in 
federal court.”339 Thus, district courts should not be swayed by the 
state’s arguments or the Supreme Court’s recent use of the “dignity” 
rationale, but should instead exercise their authority under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Supreme Court precedent in § 1983 cases 
to compel state compliance with properly-executed subpoenas issued in 
these actions. 
                                                                                                                     
 338. State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over many federal claims, including federal 
civil rights claims, see Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 396–97, and many states have waived 
immunity in state court, see, e.g., CAL. GOV. CODE § 68097.1 (West 2009). 
 339. PETER W. LOW &  JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-
STATE RELATIONS 814 (4th ed. 1998). 
55
Lynch: The Eleventh Amendment and Federal Discovery: A New Threat to Civ
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,




Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 1 [], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol62/iss1/5
